Common Council - Regular Meeting

More or less. Ready? The hour of 6.30, having arrived, I will call to order the Common Council meeting of Tuesday, July 21st, 2026, and ask the clerk to please call the roll.

Thank you. Alder Martinez-Rutherford.

Aye, I'm present.

Alder Martinez-Rutherford is present. Alder Matthews.

Present.

Matthews is present. Alder Mayer.

Here.

Alder Mayer is present. Alder O'Brien. Present. O'Brien is present. Alder Orlovich.

Present.

Orlovich is present. Alder Pritchett.

Here.

Alder Pritchett is present. Alder Tischler. Here. Alder Tischler is present. Alder Vier. Here. Vier is present. Alder Vidver. Here. Vidver is present. Alder Zhang. Here. Zhang is present. Alder Duncan and Alder Evers are excused. Alder Field. Here. Field is present. Alder Figueroa-Cole.

Here.

Alder Figueroa-Cole is present. Alder Glenn. Alder Glen is present. Alder Ugair.

Here.

Alder Ugair is present. Alder Harrington-McKinney. Present. Alder Harrington-McKinney is present. Alder Lankella.

Present.

Alder Lankella is present. Alder Lieberman.

Present.

Alder Lieberman is present. Alder Madison. Here. Alder Madison is present. Madam Mayor, we have quorum.

Thank you. As usual, I remind us that we're here to do the business of the people of Madison and ask that we do so with grace and kindness and that all be respectful and refrain from using profanity in your remarks this evening. I will go next to disclosures and recusals. Are there any disclosures or recusals on items on tonight's agenda? Alderfield.

Thank you, Mayor. On item 36, I wanted to disclose that I work at UW-Madison, which is an affiliate organization to that named in the resolution on item 36. That's a disclosure. I still plan to vote and it won't affect my vote. Thank you.

Thank you, Alder. Alder Tischler.

Yeah, I'm also a City of Madison employee. I do have to recuse myself from item 36. Oh, no, I'm sorry, which?

UW-Madison.

UW, yeah, UW, which, what did I say? Yeah. City. City, okay, well. Okay. I'm not an employee of UW, City of Madison, too. I'm not an employee. I am an employee of this UW-Madison, and I'm recusing myself from 36.

Thank you, Alder.

I'm going to have some caffeine.

Alder Mayer.

I'm not going to ditto that. I am an employee of the UW-Madison, and it will not affect my vote.

Thank you, Alder. On item 36, Alder Matthews. thank you mayor i'm also an employee of uw-madison and that will not affect my vote for writing 36. thank you elder are there any other disclosures or recusals on tonight's agenda seeing none Then we will go to the presentation of the consent agenda. President Madison. Thank you, Mayor.

A consent agenda is moved with the recommended action listed for each item on the agenda, including public hearings, except one, items which registrants wishing to speak. two items which auditors have separated out for discussion and or debate purposes. This document lists supermajority items, agenda items with recommendations different from the agenda, items for exclusion, items introduced from the floor, and agenda items with corrections. agenda items that are super majority items please note that super majority vote items will be recorded as unanimous votes unless a roll call or exclusion is requested item number 22 which is legislative file number 93775 substitute amending the 2026 sanitary sewer utility capital budget and awarding public works contract 9807 fordham avenue first street relief senate sanitary sewer In District 12, a report of Finance Committee, 15 votes required. Agenda item 23, legislative file number 93777, substitute authorizing a jurisdictional transfer agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Transportation of the City of Madison for Portionless Park Street. Actually, this was removed because we have a public comment, right? Yes. Yeah, but it's still a... Yep, yep, supermajority. I just want to be sure. I'm tired. Y'all need coffee. Okay. Portions of South Park Street, West Washington Avenue, Proudfist Street, North Shore Drive, John Nolan Drive, and South Blair Street, establishing a special revenue fund for transportation-related revenues and expenditures, and amending the budget for the North-South Bus Rapid Transit Project to appropriate $15 million from the special revenue fund. District 4, 6, 13, and 14, report of Finance Committee, 15 votes required." Agenda item with recommendations different from the agenda. Agenda item 17, which is legislative file number 93787, amending various sections of the Madison general ordinances to correct inconsistencies and improper references in the Madison general ordinances. constituting a 2026 city attorney revisers ordinance, report of common council executive committee, CCEC recommendation, CCEC met today, which is July 21st, 2026, and a recommendation will be made from the floor. Agenda items excluded by one, request of auditors, or two, speakers registered by noon on July 21st. I believe it's items 23, 22, items introduced from the floor. There are two items. The first item is legislature item number 94074 temporary class B retailer license concurrent with street use permit Marquette neighborhood association event location. Orton Park. The event date is August 28th, 2026 from 5 to 9 p.m. August 29th, 2026 from 1130 a.m. to 10 p.m. August 30th, 2026 from 9 a.m. to 8 p.m. in Police District 408, which is District 6. The event is Orton Park Festival. Refer to Common Council August 4th and ALRC on August 19th. agenda i'm sorry legislative file number 94079 temporary clasby retailer license concurrent with street use permit madison home brewers and tasters guild event location which is olin park 1156 olin turville court the event date is august 8th 2026 at 11 a.m to 7 p.m in police district 313 district 14. the event is great taste of the midwest refer to common council on august 4th for a vote there are no items agenda items with corrections in this area thank you alder on item 17 do we have a recommendation from ccec recommend to adapt

So that will be part of the consent agenda. Are there other items that Alders would like to have separated from the consent agenda at this time? Alder Pritchett?

Yes. Requesting items number 51 and 53 be excluded. Items 51 and 53.

Thank you, Alder. Are there any other items that Alders would like to have excluded from the consent agenda at this time? Seeing none, let me go over that. I'm sorry, items 51 and 53 are only on tonight's agenda for introduction, so they're not up for discussion. So you could separate them at the council meeting when they are up for discussion, but since they're only for introduction, they can't be separated. So if you have questions for staff, they will have referrals and come back to the council at a later date, at which time they could be separated. Yes, if you had additional referrals, that would be in order, but if it's just for discussion, then it's not in order tonight. Thank you, Alder. And thanks to the clerk for checking. All right, so just to cover that again, Item 22 requires 15 votes. The recommendation on item 17 is to adopt. We will be excluding items two and 23 from the consent agenda. And we have two items that are being introduced from the floor. as legislature 94704 which will go to uh alrc on 819 and the common council on 84 and item 94079 which will be at council on 84 as well and we have no items with corrections Seeing nothing else, then President Madison, a motion on the consent agenda, please. Motion to adopt.

Second.

Moved and seconded to adopt the consent agenda. Is there any objection to recording unanimous vote in favor of the consent agenda? Seeing no objection, we'll record that vote. And we'll go on to public comment. We have two items. With registrants wishing to speak tonight, the first is item two, which is a presentation from the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement. And one speaker registered to speak, Amelia Royko Maurer of Arena, Wisconsin. Amelia.

Are you able to hear me?

Yes. Okay.

Hello, I am grateful that there is a member of NACOL here tonight. My name is Amelia Royko Maurer. I am a founding member of the Community Response Team. Our work is centered around building healthy communities so that they can be safe communities with an acute focus on police accountability. And we work in a collaboration with several nonprofits throughout the city to this end. Our group was founded by social workers, restaurant workers, mutual aid professionals, a retired captain of training and personnel, as well as a retired neighborhood officer who was involved in an officer-involved death. We are artists, teachers, scientists, attorneys, retired city parks and IT professionals, just to name a handful of the folks who create our collective perspective. Our group on police accountability began 14 years ago when our dear friend Paul Heenan was killed while unarmed with hands out in front of him. Following his death, multiple people within blocks from our home were killed by police. officers who failed to follow orders, including unarmed teenager Tony Robinson. I was a key negotiator on the Michael Bell team that worked successfully for the passing of a law that requires criminal investigations of officer-involved force incidents to be conducted by an agency other than the agency involved. Since our inception, we've held NACL in high regards, and especially with OIR having reviewed MPD and the NACL president being Florence Finkel. Five years ago, the Common Council of that time voted to pass 177 required changes, some of which came from OIR, and those were to be enacted by the Madison Police Department and enforced by this council, in addition to efforts to ensure wellness and accountability. the resistance this city this current iteration not everybody but most have shown uh to independent empowered oversight and the ordinance that we all fought so hard for and that people died for and the constant undercutting undercutting of oversight and clever behind the scene ways while denying it has been so incredibly discouraging and it has wasted so much time and Even after watching Robert Johnson die on video in the back of a police car, our council president, the former council president, and two other alders continue to fight to weaken the independence of this group. While I would not portray them, the city, as the worst, I never expected the city to be such a challenge to something that the council passed. You have about 30 seconds left. I'm asking you, whomever the member is of NACOL, to please... keep a sharp eye on what's going on. I don't know what the conversation was before you came in, but I do know that the people that invited you have been incredibly disrespectful and have been part of rumor mills and misinformation since our new IM arrived. So please take caution in the relationship that you have begun. And that's your time.

Thank you. That is the only person wishing to speak on that item. Our next registrant is on item 23, which is a substitute authorizing a jurisdictional transfer agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Transportation and the City of Madison for portions of South Park Street, West Washington Avenue, Proudfit Street, North Shore Drive, John Nolan Drive, and South Blair Street. establishing a special revenue fund for transportation related revenues and expenditures and amending the budget for the north south bus rapid transit project to appropriate 15 million from the special reserve revenue fund on item 23 we have one registrant wishing to speak that is sadika deshaizer of district 17. do we have sadika You should be able to speak at least from our side. Looks good.

Can you hear me?

Yes.

Oh, fantastic.

Go ahead.

All right. Good evening, Mayor and Common Council.

My name is Sadiqa. I'm from District 17. I navigate the city by bus, bike, and car.

Taking a bus across town currently takes an hour to an hour and a half. The new BRT system added 20 minutes to my route. When I asked Metro Transit for route improvements, I was told a single route change costs $100,000 and the operational funding is simply not there. I've heard varying metrics from varying places depending on who you talk to and what area of the city you're in. Tonight, You are voting on a substitute resolution for legislative file 93777 to absorb the state highways. I reviewed the 12-side city engineering presentation in your packet. Slide 8 outlines the second agreement protecting the city from East Washington Avenue. If the payment liability for East Washington is too pricey, so is the multi-million dollar liability of John Nolan Drive. The substitute resolution takes $37 million in state payout and immediately appropriates $15 million to the BRT project, yet slide eight shows John Nolan is only assigned $12.5 million. We know that phase one of the causeway reconstruction alone costs roughly $34 million. If the project hits a standard 20% environment cost overshoot, that's nearly $7 million more. Slide nine confirms that we instantly forfeit $300,000 a year in state maintenance and aid. Over 30 years, that's $9 million. Slide 7 legally bans the city from using the federal SDP urban grants on these roads for 10 years. Simultaneously, page 57 of the city's Vision Zero Progress Report proves that choking the local streets simply displaces the high-speed traffic, causing a 166.7% spike in fatal crashes on our regional corridors. I experienced this displacement firsthand on the Beltline, surrounded by drivers speeding just to survive the flow of traffic. With the city facing an 11 million operating deficit and a transit system starving for drivers, it is deeply concerning to watch us voluntarily accept massive concrete liabilities with an empty bank account. Our community needs an equitable 30-year financial plan, and we can't sacrifice transit operations, neighborhood safety to subsidize massive state highway reconstruction squeezing the street with concrete doesn't change the reckless driver culture it forces them to speed in a different neighborhood you have about 30 seconds council vote no on the file 93777 leave the concrete debt with the state focus our local tax dollars on funding transit operators and petition the state for automated speed cameras joining in some of the petitions that milwaukee has to actually change the speeding culture And I would love to see a count for the actual cost of the maintenance.

Thank you. Are there any questions for the registrant? Seeing none, thank you very much. I'm gonna propose unless there's objection that regardless of the order on the agenda that we take up item 23 before item two, is there any objection? Seeing no objection, then let us move to item 23 which I will read again for completeness sake. Item 23 is Legislature 93777, a substitute authorizing a jurisdictional transfer agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Transportation and the City of Madison for portions of South Park Street, West Washington Avenue, Pratt-Fitts Street, North Shore Drive, John Nolan Drive, and South Blair Street, establishing a special revenue fund for transportation-related revenues and expenditures and amending the budget for the North-South Bus Rapid Transit Project to appropriate $15 million from the special revenue fund. On item 23, President Madison, a motion please. Motion to adopt. Second. Moved and seconded to adopt item 23. On item 23, are there questions for staff? Seeing none, item 23 has been moved and seconded. Is there discussion? Seeing none, item 23 has been properly moved and seconded. Is there any objection to recording unanimous vote in favor? Seeing no objection, we'll record a unanimous vote in favor of item 23. And that will take us back to item two. Item two is Legislature 94063, a presentation from the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement. On item two, President Madison, did you want to introduce this or should we just go to our guests?

Yeah, thank you. Thank you. So, and I apologize, y'all, really, I've only had coffee first thing this morning and not midday. But I want to say thank you to NACO for making this work on our schedule with the council schedule since we passed our calendar, you know, earlier in the year, for example. But I attended the June 18th, I think, PCOB meeting, and we had a presenter there. I believe her first name was Lauren. And I found the presentations to be very interesting. And based on me meeting with Lauren right after that 618 meeting, I decided it would also be great to schedule a meeting with NACO. That meeting with NACO was equally great, but the thing that came out of our discussion was that there had not been a presentation from NACO to the full council. And I thought... You know, if I'm getting this education from NACo, so should the rest of the body. I think it's important for all of us to understand how oversight boards work across the country, best practices for oversight boards, but more importantly, get the presentation that I think is useful for all of us. So, again, I just want to say thank you to both Kami and Tina for agreeing to come here. And there was a question earlier. I just want to make sure I clear this up. There was a question we got earlier about who is covering the cost of this. I asked for the presentation, so this is billed to the Common Council. This is not billed to the Office of the Independent Monitor nor to the PCLB. So just to clarify that point. So thanks again.

Thank you, President Madison. So we have two guests here from NACoL who I understand have perhaps a presentation. If you would just introduce yourselves first and then move into your presentation. Thank you.

Thank you so much. And thank you for having us this evening. My name is Kami McElhenney. I serve as the executive director of the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, or NACL for short. And I have been... with the organization for almost 30 years, working with civilian oversight entities across the country to help them either establish or enhance their oversight practices in the most effective manner possible. I have had the privilege of working with First, the PCOB, when it was first established, doing some training for those who came on board. I've also been able to work with the previous monitor and am looking forward to working providing information to all of you this evening. We do have a presentation. I'm gonna turn things over here in just a moment, but we have been asked to present on some principles of oversight, some key aspects of the Madison Ordinance, and a couple of other pieces that we find are important to oversight overall, but we also are very available for questions from all of you so that we can make sure that everybody has as much information as they need moving forward to help support civilian oversight in Madison. So with that, I'm gonna turn things over to Dr. Tina Barr, who serves as our Director of Training and Education at NACoL. Tina.

Thank you, Kami, and good evening, everyone. Thanks for having us. I've been with NACoL for three years now in the role of Director of Training and Education. And so in that capacity, I work with communities all over the country that are either establishing, trying to establish, or already have established civilian oversight entities in their jurisdiction. So doing a wide range of technical assistance, as well as training on a variety of topics. And so prior to that, I was an academia professor and doing research on wrongful conviction related issues for a number of years. And so was in that role as a professor immediately before joining NACL. So with that being said, is it okay to share my screen so that we can share our slides with everybody?

I think you should be able to.

Okay. Let me get set up.

Yes, that's coming through on our side.

All right. Very good. Okay. Okay. So this evening, Kami just briefly mentioned how we came to be here tonight. Our agenda is pretty straightforward for the evening. I am going to first review some of the principles for effective civilian oversight of law enforcement, then turn things over to Kami to review some aspects of the ordinance. And then we'll have a discussion around legitimacy in terms of defining expectations and building and sustaining legitimacy. And the first part i'll spend about 3540 minutes or so on some of the principles. The 13 principles for effective oversight are listed on this slide, however, for the sake of time this evening i'm going to focus on the principles that have a checkmark beside each one, in addition to the three that are connected. by the yellow line. We can spend a lot of time, anywhere from 30 minutes to an hour, talking about each of these principles. But for the sake of time, we're focusing on some select ones. So those principles for the evening that I'll be addressing are one, independence. Two, clearly defined and adequate jurisdiction and authority. Three, unfettered access to records and facilities. Seven, adequate funding and operational resources. Eight, public reporting and transparency. And then six, 10, and 11, these are three independent principles, but I will speak of them together. They're very closely related. That's community outreach, community involvement, and sustained stakeholder support. And then I will round things out with principle number 13, procedural justice and legitimacy. So first principle of the evening is independence. This is a critical factor in civilian oversight and law enforcement because the degree of independence that an oversight body has plays a major role in whether or not it is deemed to be a legitimate body. And so a simple definition, I go, I love simple definitions, straightforward ones. When we think of independence and civilian oversight, that can be an absence of real or perceived influence from law enforcement, political actors, and other special interests looking to affect the operations of the civilian oversight entity. The orange line at the bottom of this slide represents a continuum. And I put that there because when it comes to independence, in reality, independence, when we're talking about civilian oversight, is not a dichotomy. It's more degrees of independence or levels of independence. And I'll get to that when we talk about the three different types of independence we can think about when we're talking about civilian oversight of law enforcement. Generally, we can think of independence in terms of structural independence, political independence, and operational or procedural independence. Structural independence refers to being a clear and distinct separation of the oversight entity. from the overseeing law enforcement agency. And so this distinction is administratively, organizationally, no one within the oversight mechanism in a city answers to anyone in the overseeing agency, whether that's a police department, whether it's a sheriff's office, or whether it is a prison. So that's what structural independence refers to. The oversight entity is completely separate from the police department, jail or prison that it oversees. Political independence speaks to the extent that political actors can influence or affect oversight operations. And so political independence can be assessed in terms of a number of things. And just to name a few, the establishing authority, right? So there's a degree of independence when it comes to how an oversight body or mechanism was established in a jurisdiction. So the three typical ways are established by ordinance, established by charter, or sometimes to a lesser extent, established by a mayor's executive order. And so we know when an oversight mechanism is established by ordinance, that goes through the local policymaking process, which requires ultimately a vote by the governing body of the jurisdiction, whether it's city council or county commissioners. And so there is involvement of political actors in there. So that speaks to the continuum as opposed to the dichotomy of independence, because if you do have city council members or commissioners voting on the existence of oversight, then there is a political perceived or real influence on the existence of oversight. So it can also be assessed in terms of, or political independence can also be assessed in terms of the influence that political actors can have on staffing or composition of the oversight office or the commission. And so, for example, to what extent and what degree, what role does city council or other municipal figures have on the hiring or firing of oversight staff? if there is any role in that, but also on the appointment and removal of the volunteer board and commissioners. And so again, speaks to that continuum, that orange line on the bottom, because if commissioners are appointed, then by virtue of the appointment process, that does require political actors being involved in oversight in some way. Political independence can also be assessed in terms of the budgeting process. Is there an apolitical process in place that funds or determines the budget amount that is going to go towards oversight, or is there a discretionary process in doing so? One of the principles I will address in the upcoming slide is about sufficient funding and resources. And I'll talk a little bit more at that point about the apolitical processes of determining budgets. And then another very common way of assessing or thinking about political independence is whether or not an oversight body has independent or shared legal counsel. And so When it comes to this, I think, and correct me if I'm wrong, Kami, if you see something differently, but just in my work over the last few years with the oversight bodies that I directly work with and many, many ordinances that I have reviewed, it seems like the larger oversight entities, oversight mechanisms with lots of staff, well-funded, they are more likely to have independent counsel assigned to them working in the oversight office as opposed to mid-sized cities and smaller cities. In most cases, I think regardless of city size, there is shared counsel. The oversight body often shares legal counsel with the rest, all of the other city departments and offices, except in cases where there might be a conflict of interest. And so just so you have an idea of what that looks like, a study that NACoL was a part of that was published in 2021, there were 58 oversight agencies that responded to a survey request for information. And when it comes to legal counsel as of 2021, when the report was published, 26% of oversight bodies had independent legal counsel out of the 58. 71% actually had shared counsel between the oversight body as well as the rest of the city. And then 3% of the respondents, it said none. So I think that means that the ordinance itself did not specify who legal counsel was. Operational independence, the third form of independence or way to think about independence refers to how are decisions made on a daily basis, the operations, the day-to-day operations of the oversight mechanism. Does the oversight mechanism have the ability to make its own decisions without consulting or requiring prior approval from outside entities in the day-to-day operations? For example, is it required or does the oversight mechanism have the authority to initiate an investigation without seeking external approval? Can they draft and publish their annual reports and special reports and other reports without requesting approval or being influenced by what goes into that report? Can they plan a community engagement event, a listening session or other things that are required by ordinance without requesting approval? Can they issue a subpoena without approval? And so again, this goes to the continuum. So this can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but that's in reference to what operational independence refers to what we mean when we're talking about that. The next principle is clearly defined and adequate jurisdiction and authority. So clearly defined, I like to break things down very simply, very easily. That essentially gets to the question of, do you, anybody sitting on the council, anyone who is a commissioner, anyone in the public, Do you all know exactly what you're allowed or authorized to do? Is it clearly defined in your ordinance and other guiding documents? Adequate meaning, are you able to fulfill your mandates by the authorities that you are granted by your enabling legislation? And so, of course, any oversight entity is going to be most effective when they have the level of a authority that is needed to carry out and successfully perform their duties to the greatest extent possible without limitations. And so, for example, if someone is tasked with conducting investigations as a part of independent oversight, do they have access to all of the documentation, witnesses, involved subject officers? Do they have access to everything they need to do in order to conduct Fair, thorough, sufficient investigation. Same thing with auditors and monitors. Their work goes beyond just anything involved with misconduct complaints. And so they should have broader authorities when it comes to being able to carry out the work that they do. Now, in order to minimize confusion and to avoid different opinions or interpretations of what's in an ordinance or enabling legislation, authorities should be in writing. And this, you have to strike a fine balance when doing these. It should be a very thoughtful process. And I say strike a fine balance because in crafting these or amending, enabling legislation, Everyone should strive to be sufficiently broad in the language that is used to allow for a reasonable degree of operational flexibility. But also, you can't be so broad that there's going to be wide interpretations and varying interpretations and even conflicting interpretations of what's mandated and what's permissible. So authorities are, of course, often outlined in the enabling legislation, whether that is an ordinance, a charter, or an executive order. However, it is not always possible to include all of the minutia of carrying out those authorities. And so it's very common that... in the broadest sense that the authorities are outlined in the enabling legislation. However, there are also a need for commissions and oversight offices to work together to develop bylaws or operating procedures. And also, it's pretty common that oversight mechanisms as a whole to be tasked with working with the overseeing agency to come up with a memorandum of understanding or an operational agreement that outlines things such as, what is the flow of information between the two entities? What are the time frames that they should adhere to when exchanging information or providing recommendations or responding to recommendations? What is the process for providing recommendations at all? And so there are a lot of kind of details, the finer details that delineate how what the process is for authorities that are noted in an ordinance. Important thing to note about any ordinances or other types of enabling legislation, it is good practice and very often done so, especially when an oversight entity is newly implemented after a year or a couple years later. after the oversight entity has been in operation, that's when any flaws in the ordinance or enabling legislation can come to light. There might be a recognition like, oh, this needs to be further defined or cleared up or We need to make sure that we have a procedure regarding this authority. So it's very common practice, especially for newer oversight bodies to recognize, acknowledge what is working in an ordinance, what is not working and making amendments. And so that there is the clarity that's needed. There are if there is a flaw that they're addressed. And so the questions around you see on this slide, those are just some of the very common authorities and jurisdictions. There are hundreds and hundreds of types of questions and things to think about when considering whether it's a new jurisdiction establishing an ordinance for oversight or going through an amendment process. The next principle is unfettered access to records. And so the first block that you see here, sufficient access based on authorities ensures mandates can be met. And so sufficient access looks different based on the oversight function that an oversight mechanism has. And so across the country, different oversight bodies, some may have review functions only, Some may review and investigate, and some may have all three, review, investigate, and audit and monitor. And so the level of access that is granted to an oversight body depends on the function overall. And so we know with boards and commissions, their primary task in many cases is to review completed internal affairs investigations or independent investigations. And so... just think of what is needed in order to do a justifiable review of that case in order to make a decision on whether it was fair, impartial, thorough, sufficient, all of those things. And so in order to do that, they would need access to the completed investigation even body worn camera footage and other types of footage, but anything that they wouldn't have access to should go towards helping them determine the outcome of their review of that investigation. Investigators will have more access to records and even police personnel because of the nature of what they're doing in the course of their investigation. And then auditors and monitors They would have the highest level of access out of the three types of functions or approaches in oversight because their responsibilities aren't only reviewing or auditing and monitoring misconduct investigations, but their responsibilities extend beyond that into reviewing and auditing and monitoring all aspects of a police department so they would have the broadest latitude. When it comes to having sufficient access, it is important to note that it's the level of access that is needed to fulfill their mandates to the extent allowable by law. That is an important thing to note because there are, police officers bill of rights. There might be operational agreements that are in place that further specify the type and level of access that is allowed. The second two blocks have speak to direct access when it comes to unfettered access. And that pretty much means by direct access is meaning as directly as possible that an oversight mechanism can have to access information. For example, in the second block, direct access reduces investigation delays and law enforcement's burden. What direct access would look like is having access without having to go through as minimal as possible to go through someone in the police department requesting information for certain records or whether it's body-worn camera footage or the investigative file. But if there's a direct way as possible to get that information, then that one can reduce the delays in reviewing or investigative cases because there's not a request that has to be made and then someone in the police department to compile that information and then send it over. So it would, in a sense, eliminate that third party, the go-between between the information and the person reviewing or conducting the investigation. And also, direct access allows the oversight body to evaluate complete sets of records and data. So if the procedure is that an oversight practitioner has to make a request for information they can't have access directly, say it's body-worn camera footage. We know that some of the footage can go on for hours. And so if only 30 minutes, an hour out of four hours is provided to the oversight body, then there's a positive potential for a mistake to have been made, right? Something was overseen. And also there's just the perception, there can be real or perceived perception of, okay, did you intentionally leave something out or not? In the world and the work that we're working in an oversight, I think that is a common question, if there is not direct access or even transparency for the process. Typically, when it comes to direct access, think of databases in civilian oversight of law enforcement, right? Do they have direct access to the police department databases to review information? When there is some form of direct access, there is typically front-end access or back-end access. Front-end access allows the oversight practitioners to access the database, but they are limited to the ability to search for cases and generate specific reports that were already pre-planned or structured for them to run. They have certain limited queries that they can do themselves without having to go through someone in the police department and making the request for them to do that. Back end access allows a little more access. And so that is where an oversight professional can access where the data are stored. And sometimes it's in data tables. And so they can either access that themselves or download it and they can run queries themselves. Now, when this happens with oversight entities that have access to databases, it is standard procedure or practice to... to set permission levels so that the oversight professionals are only able to do certain things. They can't change data, they can't delete data, download it, upload it, or they're limited to what they're allowed to do by that operational agreement. They also, when oversight practitioners have direct accesses to databases, there is a timestamp, there is a record of who accesses which information, which reports, which files, and it's all timestamped so that there is a record of that. And also there is an agreement between typically in an operational agreement or a memorandum of understanding between the oversight body and the overseeing agency. It includes which computers can individuals use, oversight practitioners use to access data. I've seen some jurisdictions that require the oversight practitioners to actually go to the police department and use their computers. I've seen jurisdictions where they actually have access from the computers that are assigned to oversight staff But in any case, that should be outlined in the operational agreement or memorandum of understanding. And then also protection should be in place because at all times you've got to protect the confidentiality because there are all types of information that can be in these databases. The people who file complaints, housing, I mean, addresses, all sorts of things that must remain confidential. When it comes to unfettered access, I just have a couple of slides that show to give you a sense of what this looks like across different oversight agencies. And so this graph, was a part of a study that was recently done where the researcher looked at the 100 largest cities in the United States. And out of those 100 cities, there are 64 that have codified civilian oversight of law enforcement. So codified simply means that there is an ordinance, there is a charter, there is something in place that is in code that authorizes the existence of these oversight mechanisms. And so out of these 64, 68% of them have specifically they're enabling legislation, mentions having unfettered access to data in order to carry out their work. And then again, to the extent permitted by law. And then 70% of these 64 cities, the charters and ordinances explicitly indicate that oversight bodies have access to internal affairs investigation staff within the police department, as well as law enforcement administrators. So this is not unusual. It is pretty standard to have a high level of access, but it always has to be within the bounds of what is permissible by law. This slide here just so you can have, again, context what's happening across the country. This was from the report that was published in 2021 that 58 oversight mechanisms responded to. And so table nine on the left side of the screen, you can see those are the entities that have back end access to the internal affairs databases. And that would be the police department's internal affairs. So when they conducted their investigations into misconduct, they had access to that. And so, again, the back end is where they can run their oversight. Practitioners can run their own but they have access to the database, whether it's a replication of the database or a database with type permissions about what can be done in there. And I will say that some larger oversight offices have policy analysts or data analysts, and those are typically some of the people who know how to manipulate the data in a way that they can run the reports and do what they need in order to carry out their work that they're mandated to do. And then table 10 is out of those 58 cities with oversight. This indicates how the access to law enforcement records was determined. Was it by law, meaning by the ordinance or charter that establishes oversight. So you can see that almost 50%, it was 47% of the 58 agencies have access, specifically indicated they would have access to law enforcement records. 33% of the 58 agencies, it wasn't specified necessarily in the ordinance or charter, but there was a memorandum of understanding or an operational agreement between the oversight body and the police department or sheriff's office, the overseeing agency. And then 50% of the 58 jurisdictions with oversight, the police department or overseeing law enforcement agency actually had their own policies about sharing data. And so those percentages equal more than 100 because in several cases of these 58 cities, the access to the information how oversight practitioners would access the law enforcement information, it was addressed in more than one place. Pretty often, for example, like in the ordinance as well as in either a memorandum of understanding or in the operational agreement with the police department. So again, this is pretty standard to have something in place that delineates what the agreement is and the flow of information, how it's accessed, that sort of thing. The next principle is adequate funding and operational resources. And again, oversight, just like with some of the previous principles I mentioned, the type of oversight functions that an entity has will determine in large part the operational resources and the budget amount. And so Investigators, any oversight mechanism that has paid professionals is going to, of course, need a higher budget. And so some of the considerations that go into determining the budget is, of course, the model, whether there's review functions, investigative functions, auditing and monitoring functions. The size of the law enforcement agency that's overseeing. The workload of the oversight staff. There are a number of considerations to make. This list is not exhaustive. These are some of the more common ones that come top of mind. And then, of course, the needs of the oversight mechanism. Staffing. So benefits in addition to salaries consultants if there's ever going to be a need for consultants that should be something that's thought about ahead of time, similarly with training. Having well trained Commissioners board members staff members. speaks to the legitimacy of the organization and which we'll talk about towards the end of the presentation. But also there can be some costs associated with community outreach and engagement, right? And these aren't typically large expenses, but if there's ways that you disseminate your report that require printing costs or other costs, if there are materials, if you do tabling events or increasing awareness about oversight and its functions. Are there going to be brochures that you hand out or any types of little tchotchkes, pencils, pens, whatever those might be? And then, of course, thinking of just how overall you're disseminating reports. Do you need a translator if there are segments of the community that speak different languages or even accessibility issues? So again, not an exhaustive list of the things to consider. but just the number of them. Kami, did you have a comment?

Yeah, I was just going to add one thing to this. So First of all, I would say a lot of times when we talk about this principle, I haven't met an agency yet that complained because they were overfunded or had way too many resources. And so this is often a place where there is some work that can be done. And that looks different in different jurisdictions. In some cases, there is a basement level of funding that's available that might change based on inflation or changes made, increases made to the operational budget of the police department. Sometimes there is a flat percentage of if the... If the the the police department gets X dollars per year that then the oversight agency then receives a percentage of that budget and we see some some variation in what that percentage might look like, you know, anywhere from. 1% to, in some cases, 5%. Sometimes we see in an investigative model that they allocate salaries based on having X number of investigators per 100 officers in the department. And then sometimes we see percentages New Orleans and Chicago are a great example of this, where we see percentages of the city's total budget appropriations. So, for instance, in New Orleans, the Office of the Independent Monitor receives, I believe it's 0.14% of the total New Orleans budget, and that's in the city charter. So there's a lot of ways that this is addressed to also try and keep the oversight entity in a place where it can carry out its mandate, but also allows for oversight to not necessarily be part of anything else that's going on that might cause them to have funds pulled or whether it's You know, in some cities we've seen politics at play, sometimes not at the local level, sometimes even at the state level where money is taken away from oversight. So having some things in place to help ensure adequate funding and operational resources is a great thing to look at when looking at any possible changes that might occur.

And that can be just, well, she just explained the percentage-based and personnel-based way of budgeting or assigning, yeah, monies to the oversight mechanism. And with doing it that way, that ensures or can ensure that the oversight mechanisms, their resource increase or decrease relative to the size of the law enforcement agency or the number of sworn officers in that department. And so just so you can get an idea of what that looks like, Cami mentioned a couple of cities, New Orleans just now, This was from the report in 2021. And so I will say, even a few years later, these percentages of what this looks like might have changed since this was published. But you can see in Table 11, that's where the budgets are, the oversight budgets are a percentage of the overseen law enforcement agency. So pretty low, because it's one point, only three or above one percent. And then the table on the right, Table 12, that's the ratio, like one oversight investigator for every 89 officers in Richmond, California. So I provide these just so you can have an idea of which cities have used this type of budget allocation. whether it was the investigator to officer ratio or percentage based on the overall oversight or overseeing law enforcement agency budget. And one thing to make clear, when it's, for example, 1% of the police department's budget, that's not taking away from the police department. That's not pulling the money from the police department budget. It's simply saying it's 1% of the overall police department budget. The next principle, public reporting and transparency. When it comes to public reports, they should not be censored or modified in any way by law enforcement or political stakeholders. They should be products of the oversight mechanism. They should be accessible. And that is in terms of whether it's in varying language, if there are very common languages spoken in your community, whether it's visual or hearing impairments, making that available for people with those impairments and even reading level. And so the average reading level of an adult in this country, I think the most recent last time I looked is about seventh or eighth grade level. And so when writing a report, thinking this should be something that's accessible to the broad public, and so thinking of ways to make it as easily digestible and understandable for anyone who might pick it up or go to the website and take a look at it. We say that at minimum, there should be an annual report. that's an effective practice. Reality is that there are often oversight entities, they do more than the annual report. There are special reports if they look into a particular issue of concern in the community, or if they do a special, you know, some kind of research into an issue. And so a special report can just be thought of anything that may not be may not have enough space or appropriate to be in the annual report. And so it can require a report on its own. And it doesn't have to be something that's like extensive pages. I've seen special reports that are just a few pages, but it might've been a summary of a listening session that the oversight mechanism hosted. And so they wanted to get the summarize it and get that information out, make it available on their website. So again, it can be a short report or as long as you want. But the idea is to provide as much information through reports and other means to keep the public informed of as much as possible and other stakeholders as well. And then So I could talk about an hour or more about what goes into reports or ideally would be really helpful to anybody picking up a report to see. So I'm not going to go into detail, but I will say that whatever goes into the report should respect all confidentiality and also should keep in mind what is able to be included and publicly disclosed by law. The right side, transparency, that speaks to providing as much information as possible and legally permitted, whether it's on the website, but providing information as much as possible to the public. So if they have a question about what oversight does, what community engagement events you did, what... what your meeting agenda coming up. Anything and everything that you can provide to the public, most commonly these days on websites and to some extent on social media, if there is someone who is responsible for that, whether it's within the larger city government structure who's responsible for communications or some larger oversight entities have their own communications folks, But social media is a way that more and more I'm seeing it used to announce meetings and kind of factual information, not necessarily to put opinions out there about anything, but more education about oversight and upcoming meetings and events. Internal data, working data, guiding resources and working documents, those refer to, if at all possible, with being as transparent as possible, providing links to anything that you can think of that might be helpful to your stakeholders and the public. So that could be a link to your bylaws. It could be a link to the enabling legislation, your ordinance, working documents, right? If there are operational procedures, if there are memorandum of understanding with the overseeing police department, if there are various policies internally, make as much as possible available online so that if anyone has questions about your operations or what you're doing, They don't have to track someone down or try to reach someone in oversight or even city council members or municipal employees to find out how oversight operates and what they do. And internal data, again, that could be a whole nother hour but internal data refers to some basics information such as how many complaints have you received? How many complaints have you reviewed? What were the outcomes of those reviews? What were the recommendations that were made regarding those reviews or your audit or monitoring of some aspect of the police department and what were the responses to those? So, again, being as transparent as possible about the work that you're doing and the responses to any recommendations coming out. And that can even include how many community engagement events that you conducted or what neighborhoods did those occur and how many people attended. As much information as you can make possible is for the benefit of all stakeholders. And these three principles I will speak to as a whole or connected to each other because they are very, in my mind, they're very closely connected and they just overlap. And so when I say stakeholder, that's anybody who's invested or has a vested interest in community safety and wellbeing and constitutional policing. And so that can be... You know, of course, community members, law enforcement officers, grassroots organizers, nonprofit organizations, it's anybody and everybody who has those interests, those shared interests. Early on when oversight, when a city establishes oversight or is considering the establishment of oversight, or there's a crisis in the community, that's when stakeholder support usually runs really high. However, in order for oversight to be successful over time, it does require sustained support. And so having or not having sustained support can impact the oversight mechanism in a number of ways. For example, whether an oversight body has adequate funding and resources to carry out its mandates. Another example is whether staff positions and board and commission members are appointed, whether staff are hired or appointed, their appointments are done in a timely manner. It can also affect whether an oversight body's recommendations regarding policy and other areas they are authorized to make recommendations, whether or not they're accepted. And so in order to have sustained stakeholder support, it can't be hit or miss when your efforts towards that, but it has to be intentional about cultivating relationships, building and maintaining them. And ideally developing mutually beneficial relationships and community partnerships with all of the various stakeholders that were mentioned. And also requires operating in good faith and in a transparent manner. And when we get towards the end of the presentation where we talk about maintaining legitimacy. We'll say a little bit more on that. Community outreach and community involvement. I think of community outreach, the oversight mechanism reaching out into the community, right? How do we ensure that the community is aware that oversight exists of the work that we're doing, what we're accomplishing? And so there are a number of ways that can be done, um, speaking engagement, tabling events, those sorts of things. It's also reaching out to sharing your annual reports and other reports that you might issue. It's thinking of ways to reach out to the community, to recruit volunteers, to serve on boards of commissions, or even to, if there's an opening coming up, like encouraging people to apply for those positions. But essentially, I think of it as reaching out. Community involvement, I think of how do you pull the community and stakeholders into the work that you're doing? And so how can you solicit input feedback about oversight functions, how you're operating, concerns of the community? And so that can be done. Surveys are one example. Listening sessions are another example. Public comment periods are built into your public meetings. So that's an example. But also, you know, being creative. King County, one of their oversight mechanisms in Seattle, they actually have developed a process that involves the community input whenever they make policy recommendations before submitting those recommendations. I can't say for every single recommendations, but the ones that they know are a huge community interest, they'll actually have a session where they get feedback. And before the oversight body submits the recommendation to the police department, they listen and incorporate as much as feasibly possible the community's input regarding that recommendation. So it's built in their feedback into the final recommendation. And just so you can, again, have the context out of the 64 largest cities with civilian oversight of law enforcement ordinances and charters, 64% specifically authorize the oversight mechanism to perform some form of community outreach. So it is a big part. of oversight. And here's where commissions and boards are really important, because commission and board members, they're representatives of the communities. They're a go-between or the voice of the community. And so it's really important that they are in touch with community concerns and needs and wants. And so that's why it's written into so many pieces of enabling legislation. And then the final principle I'll address is procedural justice and legitimacy. And these are two separate concepts, but closely entwined. I'm just going to kind of go over some definitions of each of these and what does it look like in practice or what do I mean by these concepts? And then again, when we get to the rounding out the evening about establishing legitimacy, we'll touch on this again. But procedural injustice and legitimacy are the 13th principle. And procedural justice is simply the fairness of processes used by people in positions of authority to reach specific outcomes or decisions. And so the fairness of the process, the process is a key word in this definition. And so there's a simple equation that I came across. It's the outcome plus the process. is how we make an assessment or form an opinion about something. And so, for example, if I get pulled over, say I'm driving and I get pulled over by a police officer and I ultimately get a ticket in that process because say I was speeding, that's the outcome. I get a ticket. The process itself is how did that interaction go? What happened when that police officer pulled me over And when they started communicating with me, did they treat me respectfully? Did they give me an opportunity to explain what I was doing? I could have been in an emergency situation, right? Trying to get to the hospital or loved one dying. It could have been something like that. And if I was shut down and trying to explain that, I may have a very different feeling about what that process was like or what that interaction was like, as opposed to, if the officer heard me out, let me express, you know, what I was doing, why I was speeding, whether I viewed that interaction as respectful or not, that is equally an equal factor in determining the overall, my overall opinion of that police officer and that exchange. And so procedural justice speaks to the process. Kami, were you going to say something about this? All right. And so researchers, there's been quite a bit of research on procedural justice, and it actually shows that the process is more important than the outcome of the encounter. When it comes to community members forming their opinion of an interaction with an authority figure, such as a police officer. This also applies to any interactions that any community member has with anyone in oversight, whether it's a commissioner, whether it's someone in the office, office staff. This applies equally, not just between an interaction with a police officer and a community member. And so the elements of procedural justice are right here, dignity and respect, voice, trustworthy motives, and neutrality in decision-making. And so I put internal and external on the top right side of the screen, because when I do this training with boards and commissions and oversight offices, I like to point out that all of these elements of procedural justice, if you're practicing them, There should be intentionality about practicing internal to the oversight mechanism, as well as to any external stakeholder that people come into contact with. And so dignity and respect, of course, treating everyone respectfully, honoring their rights, and also taking them seriously, which is a part of being respectful about interactions, regardless of what someone's concern may be that they're trying to share with you. allowing people to be heard, voice, right? Everybody wants to be heard. They want an opportunity to share their perspectives, their thoughts, their opinions, or even their side of the story when it comes to civilian oversight, right? It's all about misconduct complaints and conducting investigations regarding those. And so... You know, if some if an investigator is conducting an investigation, by all means, allow the person or the individuals involved, the complainant, the subject officers, any witnesses, allow them the proper amount of time to share what they saw, how even if how it affected them or how it made them feel, that would look like not cutting them off immediately. asking them open-ended questions, giving them the appropriate amount of time for an interview to happen. With board and commissioners, I know from working with boards and commissions all over the country, sometimes they are approached in public, even if they're not in a formal setting, like at one of the public meetings or at a community engagement event. Even if someone approaches them outside of their conducting official business, keeping in mind, allowing them the opportunity to share their concerns or whatever it is that they want to voice, because even though you may not be in your official capacity at all times, they see you as an or see commissioners and board members as authority figures as well as office staff. And so just being mindful of always, you know, respecting people's voices as well. Trustworthy motives, this simply refers to operating in a sincere and authentic way and trying to do what is right. Keeping integrity at the forefront of all interactions and relationships. work that you're doing. It goes to avoiding self-interest, keeping the good for the public at the forefront, focusing on the public and community's concerns and needs overall. And then neutrality and decision-making refers to in the course of work that oversight practitioners go through on a day-to-day basis, making decisions in an impartial manner, making decisions based on facts, data, relevant information, factual information, as opposed to personal opinions, feelings, or emotions about something, or even speculating about something. So sticking to, you know, factual data, evidence, to avoid being non-neutral. And then also along with neutrality and decision-making is being intentional about the process that is used to make decisions, right? Is there a decision-making process that is in place? Is there a checklist to help guide the work that you're doing so that you're doing it systematically? For example, with boards and commissions, sometimes I work with them on developing a checklist for reviewing the cases that they review so that no matter how many cases they review over time, if they have a checklist of things to be intentional about looking for, They've got it right there in front of them. They will systematically look for the same things and assess the same things, whether they're reviewing 10 or 100 cases. It can be easy to forget or to oversee certain things if there's not some kind of system and something in writing in place to help guide them through the work. A couple more slides, and then I will turn things over to Kami. The concept of legitimacy. And so procedural justice and legitimacy, I told you they go, they're very close to tied together. That's why they are one principle. The definition of legitimacy, a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed systems of norms, values, beliefs, So essentially, when it comes to oversight, an oversight body, whether it's a commission or an office, legitimacy refers to, does the community, does a particular stakeholder, do they see your existence as a body as desirable, proper, or appropriate? In the context of procedural justice, legitimacy refers to the extent to which an organization and its agents are perceived as morally just, honest, and worthy of trust and confidence. And morally, in this sense, can be thought of, are you operating in an ethical manner? Is the work that you're doing ethical? And so to break things down, I hope to break things down, make it a little more clear if it's not, for anybody, whether anybody in the public, in the community, to evaluate any organization or entity that exists in the community. There are certain questions that they can ask themselves and that will determine whether or not they believe that the entity is legitimate. And so there's pragmatic legitimacy, cognitive and moral legitimacy. These are not the only three types of legitimacy. I like this framework. It's pretty simple. There are quite a few other frameworks of legitimacy, but I thought this is easy to apply to oversight, police departments, any other framework. agencies or entities. And so pragmatic legitimacy is all about the practicality of an entity or if there's a value, if it makes sense to have that particular entity. And so some questions people might ask themselves and trying to think about whether an agency is legitimate from a practical sense or a pragmatic sense is, does the agency align with my own interests? Am I getting anything of value? And that can be a direct or indirect value from the oversight mechanism. And what is the benefit overall of the oversight body to me? So when people as individuals are determining what they think about you, whether you're the organization is legitimate or not, they're not thinking, oh, does my whole neighborhood think about this? Not all the time. They may. But first and foremost, they're going to do an assessment for them as an individual. Do these things apply to me? If those answers are no under pragmatic legitimacy, then there's a problem with your legitimacy from that particular stakeholder. Cognitive legitimacy has to do with, do things make sense? When I think about how the oversight mechanism executes its activities and its mandates. So some of those questions that get to the heart of cognitive legitimacy are, do I know and understand what this oversight body does? is the oversight body doing what it's supposed to do? Is it accomplishing what it's supposed to? And are the processes that it has in place, that it's employing, are they efficient? Are they effective? And again, if the answers to those questions are no, then there's a hit in the legitimacy. And then the final form of legitimacy on this slide is moral legitimacy. And again, that has to do with whether or not someone deems something to be ethical. It has to do with right or wrong. And so some of the questions... around moral legitimacy might be, is the oversight body a force for good in this community? Should the oversight body be carrying out its activities in the way that it's actually doing so? And are its practices ethical? And so... If the answer to some of these questions, a lot of the questions, some, a lot, are no, there is an issue there. If the answers to these are yes, then you are more likely to be deemed legitimate in the eyes of the individual kind of asking themselves questions about this. I'm gonna turn things over to Kami now to get to the ordinance.

Thanks, Tina. I appreciate that. And just before we start diving into the ordinance, I know that you all know the ordinance. Some of you may know it more intimately than others, but a lot of times when we're asked to review this, It becomes a good exercise, particularly following a conversation about the principles of oversight, kind of looking at it in a new light and how it works, not only in the principles of effective oversight, but those effective practices that come out of those principles. So with that, if you'll go to the next slide, Tina, we'll just kind of jump in. I'm going to try to go through these fairly quickly, knowing that. We'll have as much time as you would like for questions after. But let's start first with the Police Civilian Oversight Board. So at the beginning of this section of the ordinance, there's several things that are talked about. I'm going to really focus just on purpose and procedures here. You have the composition and the appointment of those members. The Common Council is so intimately involved in that process. I thought that we could, for time's sake, kind of move past those. But the purpose is at its core to respond to the needs and concerns of the community to help build trust with Madison Police Department and to work cooperatively with the Office of the Independent Monitor and the community to review and make recommendations on things like police discipline, rules, hiring, training, community relations, complaint processes, use of force practices and policies. But really focusing a lot on that to respond to the needs of the community and build trust through all of those things. In regards to procedures, One of the most important pieces of this is that the board shall create a policy and procedure manual. And that seems very basic, but it is an incredibly important part in that it provides information about the role, the responsibilities, the duties of the board, the relationships of the board to the Office of the Independent Monitor, the required training and special board rules and procedures. It is, we often are glad to see the requirement of that in an ordinance because it becomes this easy access guide for what the board is doing and what it is holding itself to. It's easily accessible to the broader community in a way that sometimes ordinances and the language they're in are not. I also want to, even though it's not highlighted here, kind of talk a little bit about the training and support. This is a very important part, particularly for board and commissions. I don't want to underscore the need for oversight practitioners. Those who are members of staff of agencies, their training is very important as well. As a bit of background, I started an oversight as a board member in a city myself of a review board. And although I had the best intentions when I volunteered to be on that board and was appointed, I quickly realized that although I was there to make a difference, I didn't have all of the necessary information that I needed to be successful. And so that's why I'm still here today. I'm trying to help make sure that people have the information that they need to be successful. You may not have all of the information about policies and procedures. You might not know the ins and outs of constitutional policing. You might not know what the effective practices around auditing or monitoring. You might not know about Robert's rules of order or open meeting laws or what a FOIA request is. entails. But it is important to learn those things and be trained on them along the way, particularly if you are, in the case of the PCOB, in charge of supervision of anyone, to make sure that you know about city policies and procedures, that you know about how a meeting should be run. And it is not a big deal that you might not know that going into it. But if we are asking so much of community to come in and serve in these roles, it's also important to provide the training that they need to be successful. So I just always like to underscore that because I do think that sometimes the training kind of gets a secondary mention when it is such an important part. And important to remember that while NACOL is really good at training about civilian oversight of law enforcement and all around there, there's a lot more that goes into it. Training from the police department and their policies and procedures, the training protocols are all important pieces of information, too, as the oversight entity goes forth in its work. If you could go to the next slide, Tina. So next I wanna talk a little bit about the powers and duties of the PCOB. I'm gonna try to go through these quickly, but with the principles in mind that Tina just spoke of. So one of the first ones, appoint, supervise, and evaluate the monitor. So according to the ordinance itself, the board is in charge of recruiting, appointing, and supervising the independent monitor, as well as evaluating the effectiveness of the monitor's office as well. In Tina's presentation, She mentioned after time, you start to see maybe some issues with the ordinance and things that need to be corrected or tightened up. Things like an evaluation of the effectiveness of the overall office is a really important part as you move forward. Actually looking at what the practice is and what would improve those practices. Also, the board provides input to the mayor and common council regarding the effectiveness of the office of the independent monitor, as well as the work that they're doing. Next, we have conduct the annual review of the chief. So with the input of the monitor, the board is asked to conduct an annual review of the chief to assess the performance in office and then submit a report to the mayor and the police and fire commission for completion of their annual performance review. I think it's important to note, because I know somewhere, I believe in public comment, someone mentioned the work of OIR and the Ad Hoc Subcommittee. Several places in this ordinance, they talk and refer back to the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee. This is one of those places. This was something that was originally recommended by the Ad Hoc Committee and followed through to the ordinance. The report should include that they give recommendations as to whether or not the chief satisfactorily performed their duties. I mentioned that the recommendations of the ad hoc committee, because I do think that where that is noted, that it is important to go back and make sure that those things and recommendations are still being thought about where necessary. Next, conducting community outreach. Tina went fairly deep into community engagement and involvement and stakeholder engagement. Community outreach and engagement is really one of the superpowers of an oversight board or commission. Because they are members of the community, they often can reach community in a way that law enforcement almost certainly cannot. Elected officials can't always. And it's also a way to use community to make sure that you're hearing voices of those that you don't necessarily always hear from. Those who might be concerned or frightened to come forward with their opinions and their concerns. So it's very... having that community piece makes oversight stronger. And this is one of the reasons why is their ability to conduct outreach and engagement. Next, we have making policy recommendations. So the board is asked to make policy level recommendations regarding discipline, use of force and other policies, including those related to rules, hiring, training, and community relations as conducted by MPD. They can also address any other issues of concern that the community raises. and not just the community, issues that they see themselves, the monitor, the chief of police, the mayor, or the common council see. They can also, because they have monitoring capability through the Office of the Independent Monitor, they can direct work to be done that leads to policy-level recommendations for concerns that they might have or any other stakeholder group that they find through the process of engagement. Next, the publishing of annual reports. So again, Tina talked about this. This is the outlet to all stakeholder groups about what's going on, what work is being done. The ordinance talks about the board compiling and presenting an annual report to the mayor and common council. And at a minimum, one that includes an assessment of the monitor's office, the board's activities for the year, concerns of the community that arise, an assessment of Madison Police Department investigative and disciplinary processes, recommendations to improve community relations, and recommended changes to rules, the policies, hiring, training, and complaint processes that are in place. Although it is not talked about in the ordinance, as Tina mentioned, it's important to think of that many oversight entities also in addition to this do special reports on audits or special monitoring projects that they've taken on. And then lastly, under powers and duties, we have the issuance of subpoenas. So according to the ordinance, the board may to the extent permitted by law, that's always a very important piece when we're talking about the actions of oversight. As Tina talked about, the access to information is often guided by more than just our need for the information to carry out the mandate. A lot of times there are issues that might come into play as far as state laws are concerned, collective bargaining agreements that can limit access to certain types of information. However, it is important to note that the board has the ability to issue subpoenas per the ordinance. Next slide, please. So just some other considerations when we're still talking about the board that I wanted to bring up is that, and this is, we don't see this in a lot of boards because of the special role that police and fire commission play in your state. The board's various duties give it the ability to review discipline decisions and processes, to evaluate standard operating procedures of the police department, And also, it has the ability to conduct formal inquiries. But none of that gives the board the ability or the authority to impose discipline, to reverse disciplinary decisions, or mandate any other action or decisions that is under the purview or previously carried out by the PFC. Also, the relationship with the independent monitor is something to consider. When looking at other oversight entities, just as a side note, throughout the United States, Madison ordinance is a little different in that this board supervises, has a supervisory role over the monitor. It's required to work collaboratively with the Office of the Independent Monitor and the monitor themselves and the community to review and make recommendations regarding things like training, community relations and complaint processes. But it also is specifically asked to supervise the independent monitor. So that is something that we easily put under special considerations or other considerations because it differs from many ordinances throughout the United States in that regard. Okay, I'm ready for the next slide now, Tina, thanks. Okay, so next we're going to talk about the Office of the Independent Monitor. So I think as far as purpose and its creation is concerned, it very much is in line with what we've already talked about, the PCOB, to provide civilian oversight of the Madison Police Department and ensure that it's accountable and responsible to the needs and concerns of all segments of the community and thereby building and strengthening MPD's relationship and trust throughout the community. The Office of the Independent Monitor has, of course, an independent monitor, and it's directed by that monitor. They are a managerial employee of the city, except in all ways, just like other managerial employees of the city, except that they are recruited, hired, and supervised by the Police Civilian Oversight Board. That makes that a very different position than others because of that recruitment, hiring, and supervision piece. They are responsible for ensuring that the duties of the office are fulfilled in both consultation and collaboration with the board. And of course, available to anyone the adequate funding that Tina talked about earlier. The monitor is responsible for hiring and supervising professional, sufficient professional staff to support and perform the duties assigned to the office. Next, moving on to minimum qualifications of the monitor. The ordinance is pretty clear that the person should have extensive knowledge of civilian oversight leasing. They also mentioned extensive knowledge of, in quotes, best practices. Now I will say, At NACoL, we often don't ever use the term best practices. We often refer to them as effective practices. And we could spend a whole night on training of best versus effective and why that is and then what data is available to prove what practices should be used. But that aside, it does talk about using the best practices. not only in civilian oversight, but also in policing civil rights and equity. As far as the recruitment appointment and confirmation of the monitor, I'll just go through this very quickly. The recruitment and appointment by the board is done with the assistance of the Common Council and the Office of Human Resources. Again, we have a group of community members who are in charge of this process, but it is possible that not everyone has experience in hiring practices, HR, employment law. And so having that assistance to help guide them through the process is very important and the training around it as well. Once the recruitment process is underway, it should include broad community-based outreach, and that would ensure that the individual will provide the expertise and independence necessary to carry out the duties of the office. Once the appointment of the monitor is made, it is actually, per the ordinance, not effective until confirmed by the Common Council. Next in our list, we have supervision of the monitor. So as I've mentioned previously, the monitor reports directly to the board and the board's executive subcommittee. And it's intended for the monitor to have significant independence and discretion in conducting the day-to-day activities of the office. But at the same time, the monitor is directed to act or is to act as directed by the board and the board's executive committee. As someone who works for a board myself, it's kind of that division of day-to-day versus setting policy or directive. And so that is a fairly common setup when you have a board that is in a supervisory role. And then lastly, the independence of the monitor. So the monitor should be, and is in all respects sufficiently and should remain sufficiently independent of the police department in order to prevent the office and the MPD from becoming so closely aligned that the office cannot effectively fulfill its mandate or its duties. For example, at a minimum, and this is just a very basic example, at a minimum, having the Office of the Independent Monitor not be located within the police department itself. When we were talking about procedural justice and legitimacy, the work word person over again. And I think that many of us would agree that perception and reality often have a way of merging and perception becomes reality to many. And so making sure that there's sufficient distance and independence, whether that is uh operationally um or investigative wise from the department that is um paramount to the operations of the office of the independent monitor in addition the monitor according to the uh the ordinance the independent from city staff and officials um so Specifically, the ordinance states that no city employee or official shall attempt to use their political or administrative power or position, I'm sorry, to unduly influence or undermine the independence of the monitor or any of the office of the independent monitor employees. in the performance of their duties and responsibilities. So for instance, asking for changing of data in a report or asking for the change of a disposition of an investigation. Many cities have information like this in the ordinance. where they hope to clarify independence. So I think earlier I mentioned when we were talking about budget, but independence-wise, some of the most important there are several oversight entities in the country that would individually declare themselves as the strongest oversight entity in the country. And I am definitely not going to be the one to judge that as cowardly as that may seem. But I will say that Most of them, even though they find themselves as having fairly independent structures, whether that is structurally or politically or operationally, they still exist within a city structure. So often they will have to... maintain a strict operational investigative independence so that they are seen as being able to be fair and impartial in their work as oversight and oversight entities. But then they also operate under the same rules that other offices would operate within the city or municipal structure. For instance, really personnel policies are an easy one and often come to mind. The people that work for an Office of the Independent Monitor follow the same personnel policies that someone who worked in another department within the city would follow, while still being very independent in their work that is specific to the oversight. Okay, so moving, can we go to the next slide, please? Okay, so powers and duties of the Office of the Independent Monitor. And I apologize, we'll fix the top of that slide. It should say Independent Monitor instead of Police Civilian Oversight Board. So they monitor policy compliance. So they monitor whether or not, essentially, the police department is in compliance with its own standard operating procedures, its governing laws, and then any lawful orders from the Common Council. Next, we have monitor NPD programs, activities, investigations, and use of force incidents. So the office is... to actively monitor MPD audits of their programs and activities, any police officer use of force incidents, any investigations of its personnel. And while it's in the process of monitoring this, it may submit requests to the police department and the chief of police to investigate or further investigate any matter the monitor is reviewing. It is stated in the ordinance that the police department must respond to the monitor's request in writing, stating whether it intends to conduct a further investigation and, if not, stating reason it will decline to conduct the investigation. But at any time, the monitor may choose to undertake its own independent investigation of MPD personnel, including the chief of police and all represented and nonrepresented personnel of the department in response to any external or internally generated complaints of misconduct. Also under that heading, we also have making recommendations to the chief of police. So based on its review of the department's programs, activities, investigations, it may make recommendations to the chief of police regarding administrative action, including possible discipline for such personnel. While it does not have discipline authority to implement or... discipline, it can make those recommendations. It can also make referrals to the Police and Fire Commission. So based on its review, it may refer appropriate cases to the police, to the PFC so that its members, that commission's members may consider initiating disciplinary action. In addition, something that is not common in oversight ordinances that we see, but one piece that I find very interesting, is the ability to appoint counsel to provide representation to aggrieved individuals in presenting and litigating complaints against the department. when litigating complaints against the department personnel to the PFC, to the extent that the monitor has found that those complaints have arguable merit. And I think that the limit, the board comes up with a list of eligible attorneys who have the capability of providing this service, and then Each required case or case that is moved in this fashion, the attorneys can be paid up to $15,000 for representing the individual. Other monitoring requests requested by the board. So also under this piece, the office of the independent monitor can monitor any other internal investigation of possible misconduct or undertake an independent investigation of possible misconduct by personnel when requested to do so by the PCOB. The next duty and power that I'll talk about is the ability to make policy recommendations. It can make policy recommendations regarding really any policy issue and address any other issues of concern that come up from the community or members of the board or even the chief of police or other department personnel. It can look into those recommendations and further them. And that also includes any concerns that are brought to them by the mayor or the common council. The Office of the Independent Monitor also has a public reporting requirement. And it's one of the key elements of the office is the duty to develop and issue independent reports and recommendations. And these recommendations are for the PCOB, the mayor, the common council, and for the community. So all of those are audiences for this report. And it should require, at a minimum, the work of the office during the prior calendar year, trends regarding complaints, investigations, and discipline of Madison Police Department personnel, including, but without identifying specific persons, information regarding personnel who were the subject of multiple complaints, Complaintants who filed multiple complaints themselves and issues that were raised by multiple complainants. So in other words, reporting trends that they saw throughout the year. Making any recommendations regarding the sufficiency of investigations and the appropriateness of disciplinary actions and any changes to policies, rules and training that they would recommend. because of them. Provide any other pattern or practice analysis as needed and assess the, again, this is in regards to the ad hoc committee's recommendations, assess the MPD's progress in complying with its own standard operating procedures, its laws, lawful orders from the Mayor of Common Council, and then its compliance with the ad hoc committee's recommendations. In addition to the annual public report, ongoing public status reports are in the ordinance to be maintained. So it's asked that in addition to the annual report, the OIM report, maintains an ongoing status report, which is available to the public at any time, and which shall include, among other things, patterns relating to complaints and recommendations regarding the sufficiency of investigations, determinations, and other department rules, policies. In other words, it is a easily accessible throughout the year report that can provide information on the things that will be further reported on in the annual report. And then the Office of the Independent Monitor, at its discretion, can issue additional public reports of any special considerations or monitoring or auditing that it has undergone throughout the year. Next, we have process complaints. So the office is to create and support a process for receiving and investigating complaints from community members, not only about the police department, but also the chief of police and any police department personnel. It also conducts community outreach. It's really important that not only that the community know the monitor, but it's also important that the monitor knows the community and that there is a relationship where the community can provide information to the monitor so that they can know what the concerns are of the community and the desires of the community for the work of the monitor are. The monitor serves as the staff and pointedly the executive secretary of the board to ensure, and then it also works to ensure that the board has the resources and that it needs to fulfill its duties, whether that is budgetary or otherwise. They are also responsible for hiring staff and engaging independent contractors, whether that's investigators or independent counsel. In addition, they, to the extent allowed or permitted by law, have unfettered access to all services. police department records, their policies, their procedures, data, computer databases, and other information necessary to fulfill the duties of the OIM. In addition, the monitor may, again, to the extent permitted by law, issue subpoenas for the purpose of compelling testimony or receiving documents necessary to fulfill the duties of their office. Okay, I think we can go to, oh, lastly, retaining independent counsel. So the ordinance allows for the ability for the monitor to retain independent counsel, legal counsel when needed. Can we go to the next slide, Tina? Just a couple of other considerations when we're looking at the Office of the Independent Monitor. So, first of all, assisting with the annual review of the chief. We talked a little bit about this earlier, but this is a key component of the review. of the monitor's work because it does provide the oversight entity's insight into the report that will eventually be completed by the PFC. Confidentiality, the monitor and all of the staff within the Office of the Independent Monitor and all the consultants and experts that they hire must, all of the information that they handle regarding specific investigations or officers or complainants as confidential, except to the extent needed to carry out their duties. This also is something that when we talk about the policies and procedures, the standard operating procedures that need to be created by oversight entities, how it's really important to try and put all of this information about how information will be handled into those procedures so there are no issues. Tina and I both have heard horror stories over the years of things like investigative case files, being in a car that gets broken into and stolen, things like that. So having very firm policies in place so that you can make sure that confidentiality is protected and that you also, the office itself is protected from any mishaps of their own information leaking. Also, the relationship of the monitor and the police department. So this really centers a lot around the MOU that needs to be developed that really falls into standard operating procedures for how the relationship will be governed, how the flow of communication works. when we're talking about investigations, complaints handling, appeals that might happen, and any findings that are given regarding the department as a whole or individual officers. The monitor and the department and the chief of police are to provide each other with notice of complaints, allow notice of investigations that they are doing so that there is a complete understanding of everything that is going on on both sides. We often talk about that it is really important for oversight to take the job of promoting accountability and transparency in law enforcement very serious. It's one of the one of the main purposes of civilian oversight. But at the same time, it is important to hold civilian oversight and its operations to the same standards of accountability and transparency. So just making sure that there is a flow of information back and forth. And it's not just transparency and accountability with the law enforcement. That also flows over to how and the information from the independent monitor is given out to the community at large. So just to kind of close things up here, the MOU also dictates the unfettered access to the documents, how that information will be taken, how it will be used, how it will be protected, and is something that not only needs to be put together, but it needs to also be revisited to make sure that it continues to meet the needs of the oversight mechanisms mandates and is still in compliance with all applicable laws. So I think I think we may be lucky enough for that to be my last slide. I appreciate everyone's patience and listening and being talked to for so long. But we are available for any questions that you might have. I know that was a lot of information, but we would love to provide any additional information you might find is helpful.

Thank you. Very comprehensive. Are there questions from the Council for our presenters? Alder Tischler.

I didn't expect to be first. I guess my first question is how many city members do you have in your organization?

So we have several different levels of membership in our organization. One of them is an organizational membership, which encompasses everyone within the oversight entity. So if we were to count all of those people that make up the organizational members as well, we're sitting at about, at any given time, between 2,000 and 2,500 individuals.

And then Tina mentioned about a discussion about access to records mentioned body worn cameras. And I guess my question is, do you know how many of your members have memberships that have police forces that have body worn cameras?

I don't know that answer. No.

And I guess just in the question with access to records, the importance of unfederated, why do you think those member cities that do have police force with body worn cameras, why do you think it's important that they do allow that?

You mean to have body-worn cameras or to have access?

To have body-worn cameras, right, for the purpose of civilian oversight.

Well, I think the access is the issue for civilian oversight, whether or not the police department has it, has actually used body-worn camera. The issue is the access from my perspective. Like if we're working with investigators or they're independent investigators that are a part of an oversight office, then in order to conduct their investigation, then it would make sense to me that they have access to the footage if there's body-worn cameras so that they can make their own determinations about what that interaction is, what that footage captured, as opposed to relying on a police summary report about what was on that footage. Same thing with oversight bodies. I know that there, I mean, excuse me, with commissions and boards, I know that there are oversight commissions and boards that actually have access to that footage as well, because a part of their determination is whether the investigation, whether it was conducted by the police department's internal affairs unit, or whether it was conducted by the oversight investigator, regardless of who conducts the investigation, the commission or board is tasked with reviewing that investigation. So in order to make their determination, it is helpful that they actually see the footage themselves as opposed to relying on reports or summaries from a third party.

And I would just add to that. So if we're looking at it from how the use of body-worn cameras has been beneficial or just used by civilian oversight entities, it often provides many vantage points to an incident that otherwise would be... eyewitness or often officer accounts of a particular incident. In oversight, one of the unfortunate things that we see is a lot of times investigations are determined to be unfounded because there are two people there, there's no video, and it is one person's word against another. And so there's no way to prove or disprove an allegation. What we find often with the use of body-worn cameras, although it is not a given 100% of the time, is that there is more information. It's another eyewitness account that people can actually see now. With body-worn cameras, there needs to be a lot of things put into place, such as consideration of privacy, when are they turned on, when can they be turned off, if they can be turned off, what are the manufacturer's recommendations, making sure that everyone knows how they should be used, making sure that the community is aware of their use and how they should be used. So there's a lot of other factors in there, but we have seen oversight use them over the years in a way that provides additional information and an investigation that wouldn't otherwise be there.

Well, thank you. Thank you for presenting tonight.

Thank you, Alder Herrington-McKinney.

I'll come back with my questions, but my first one is, will the slide deck be provided?

Yes, that will be available in Legistar, and I assume Karen will email it to everyone as well. Yes. Okay, I'll come back with my other questions. Thank you. Thank you, Alder. Alder Okovitz?

Thank you, Mayor, and thank you both for the presentation. It was very helpful, especially, I think, I found very helpful breaking down the different types of legitimacy and sort of how that factors into people's perception of the board and the police civilian oversight in general. I have two questions. So one, are PCOBs all volunteer? I assume that most PCOBs are mostly volunteer. Is it generally a reasonable expectation for a volunteer board to write a manual report? Is that something that you see in a lot of other cities?

Go ahead, Tina.

It's pretty standard that there is an annual report. In cases where there are oversight, there's an office with staff, they can provide assistance with writing that report. There are some smaller communities that all they have is a review board, they don't have office staff. It's pretty common that included in their ordinance that they're still tasked with writing an annual report. So whether there's office staff or not, it's a pretty standard thing. The fortunate thing when there is office staff is that there's added support for the commissioner or board because that's a big task for volunteers to do. And so the idea is the staff helps out.

Yeah, that makes sense. Thank you for that information. And then the other thing I wanted to ask about is you've probably heard there's been discussion of the ordinances around the OIM, and that's, I think, why you were at the July meeting. And you were talking a lot about the creation of the board. One of the first things you talk about is, let me look at my notes to make sure I get it right, but the perceived legitimacy of the board by the community and by stakeholders. It's not just based on how the board is created legally, but also the background. Some boards have been created in the midst consent decrees or other external legal mechanisms that effectively require maybe not the exact makeup of the board or, you know, how the Office of the Independent Monitor works, but, you know, all these other things. And those background things, in addition to everything that's codified into ordinance, affect the perceive legitimacy of a vote board like that. And so in Madison, we're not under consent decree, although this was created as the result of police shootings. So there is that background there. But to get to my question, what I'm really wondering is like sort of does your organization have different recommendations for this based on sort of the background, like how independent a monitor should be. I mean, one of the things we're talking about is like, should they have full-time legal counsel and full-time HR independent of the city? Should they be governed by APMs, which are essentially executive orders governing a bunch of different things, but you know, does your organization have different recommendations based on light of the background of the organization and like its current perceived legitimacy.

So I'll jump in and then Tina, please feel free to jump in as well. So I think it's important to note that kind of the underlying piece to this answer is that every community, every civilian oversight, but the 250 some oversight entities that exist in the country in one form or another, not one of the two of them are alike. They all differ somewhat. You can find some that are a not only under different state laws and with different collective bargaining agreements, but they also have varying levels of political will during the process that kind of takes what might be the recommendation, and then this is what you end up with in the end. So I would say that with that in mind, there are a lot of things to consider when we're talking about independence and what things should look like. I will say that building legitimacy and setting appropriate expectations from what I've seen is one of the hardest jobs of a civilian oversight entity because there are a ton of expectations that come before they even open their doors. And most people don't have any concept of what they can and cannot actually do. They just know what they want them to do. And so building and teaching and, I guess, educating the community on what they can and cannot do, what they intend to do, making sure that all of the stakeholders understand that. what their mandate is and that they also then spend time finding out what everybody's concerns and expectations where they're realistic or not are so that they can work with that as they work to build legitimacy.

Yeah.

And I'll just add, it's hard to say like to make a recommendation without doing, without getting the full context or more having more information about what Madison itself, the history, you know, just I feel like there's a lot of information that I'm not aware of. And even policy wise, like what are city policies? What are the APMs? How do they apply to other departments? I think the one recommendation I know for sure is for me, as in my position, is that oversight should not be housed in the police department, which sounds kind of like a no brainer, but. I have come across a couple like that, which, of course, is a huge hit on the legitimacy of the oversight entity itself. Other than that, yeah, that degree of the continuum of independence, there's a lot that goes into that. And also, I think most cities I've worked with, they appreciate that we don't come in if we're not doing like a full-on technical assistance research and focus groups and all that. They appreciate that we don't come in and give our recommendations when we haven't done our due diligence yet. because we're outsiders. You all know your city way more than we do, and we haven't done that type of work to arrive at any kind of close to a recommendation about it.

But I can tell you that one of the things that we do do is often provide information about other cities for very specific questions. How are people handling... A, B, or C in not necessarily similar sized cities, because I have to tell you, there are cities bigger and smaller than Madison that are doing great things and everything is scalable. So definitely don't focus if you're looking at how other people are doing it just in one aspect. A lot of times, you know, I like to use the example, like I might say something about New York City and everyone's like, no, we're not in New York City. Well, no, I mean, no one has a police force that big. That doesn't mean they don't have practices that wouldn't benefit other oversight entities across the country. So yeah, we're happy to provide additional examples of ordinances, ordinance language or practice in place if that's helpful through your process.

Okay. Thank you both. This has been very helpful.

Thank you, Elder Pritchett.

Yes, I have several questions. And I'm going to try and focus the attention on training. At the top, you did mention the structural, the political, as well as the operational kinds of things that NACAL deals with. But when I think about or when you look at the training, especially for those who decide to volunteer for PCOB, for those who are appointed to a PCOB, I wonder whether or not your training includes many givens, such as the person's background, his or her prior or previous exposure to police and policing, his or her race, his or her sex, his or her economic status. Here's her biases. No person becomes a member of a PCOB as a blank slate. That's a given. So knowing then that each and every person becomes a member, is appointed to PCOB, how and what do you do? to ensure that each and every member then has a necessary training such that he or she or the entire group begins to think as one, especially when one looks at the different cases that they will be evaluating. Now, I wonder whether or not you use, let's say, archived cases. You can redact them. you can present them to each and every person to determine whether or not they're coming up with the same conclusion regarding what they see, what they think happened. Now, absent doing that, absent looking at objectivity, absent looking at subjectivity, how do we ensure that the person that is the subject of an investigation is going to receive the fairness that he or she deserves, especially if a member is using his or her biases to determine a particular outcome. It's the training that I'm interested in, and this is something that you did not include in your presentation.

And so training, like adequate training, sufficient training, it plays a role in the legitimacy of the organization. And so we mentioned having monies in the budget to get onboarding training, continuing training. Just a little bit about my background before I respond to that question. So I do have a master's and a PhD in social work. And so I have taught... issues around equity, police, the history of race and policing, cognitive and implicit biases. And so soon after I started working with NACoL, I did develop a training specifically on cognitive and implicit biases. specifically doing the work of oversight and specifically with board and commission members, with investigators, anybody who comes into contact in any way whatsoever, whether they're reviewing or investigating a case. And so I, when I'm requested or when NACoL is requested to do training regarding that, I do that training and I do use a case scenario that was developed specifically for this training. When I use actual cases, I ensure that they are publicly available, so I'm not violating any confidentiality. But even when I do that, I don't use like I don't identify the city where the case came from. I just simply use the information that I can access about a particular case just for the scenario for educational purposes. So I do use actual cases as well as a scenario that was created specifically for, I guess, like the intro level of the reviewing and conducting investigations. And then generally when it comes to training, Over the three years I've been with this association, in my mind, I've come to develop four buckets of training that I think any oversight mechanism, whether boards and commissioners, whether staff members should have. And so one of the buckets, of course, is training specifically on oversight, the principles, the approaches to oversight, the history and evolution of oversight in this country, investigating, reviewing cases, you know, going into detail about transparency. So there are a number of trainings that are very specific and come from the perspective of oversight. The second bucket would be, of course, any training that would be helpful and beneficial to commissioners, board members, office staff on police policies and procedures. After all, it is imperative if there are going to be recommendations that are being made regarding police policies, procedures, practices, if even for people reviewing the cases, making a judgment on whether or not policy was upheld or violated, then it is important that that type of training come from the police departments. Like they're the experts in their policies and procedures and practices and So some of the training in that regard should come from there. The third bucket would be, Cammie mentioned, like what it is to be on a commission, what it means to follow Robert's Rules of Order, what it is if you're a staff member, which policies apply to you. And so that kind of training would have to come from commission. You know, city officials themselves who are doing the work, whether it's legal, whether it's H.R. I don't know who would do rules, Robert's Rules of Orders, but that third bucket is city generated and provided delivered training. And then the fourth bucket of training, I think of kind of as a catch all. It's things that would benefit anybody in oversight, as well as other community members and stakeholders involved. That would inform the work that they're doing. For example, what is the history of policing and what is the history of oversight in your own city, right? How did oversight even come to be? What was the work that was required to get it to exist in the first place? Also, like any training regarding policing and mental health issues. We do know that a lot of people who might come into contact with have police interactions or even contact the oversight office or commissioners might reach out to commissioners or board members. Sometimes they don't necessarily have an issue that is most appropriately handled by the oversight office. It might not even be about a complaint. Sometimes it's about a social service or a mental health need that they're looking for, but they see the oversight mechanism as, hey, that's an office that seems like they can help me, and they'll reach out. So what are some mental health issues, resources, mental health issues that might be helpful for anybody who's conducting investigations, conducting reviews, monitoring cases. Similarly, like trauma informed practices, that is a real requested area of training, especially for people who are conducting investigations and oversight. And so that fourth bucket I see as a catch all anything that the oversight mechanism identify as being helpful for them to have in order to carry out the work that they do. And I hope I answered all the questions that were in there.

I understand that. But what I'm trying to get to is this. As I said before, for the person who volunteers, for the person who is appointed, when you start looking at, and you mentioned early on, morality, You mentioned ethics. Now, a phrase that I use all the time is this. How do you get a person to do a checkup from the neck up? Meaning, you've got to come in. And you're going to bring this bias. You're going to bring however it is that you've had a relationship with the police department. But how do you get past that? There are individuals. who will not see it, not get past it. Because if it's not discussed, if you don't talk about it, you know, whoever real case comes before the PCOB, I can pretty much guarantee you right now, they're not going to get a fair shake. And so I would rather, instead of talking about, you know, looking at institutional kinds of things that should happen, I would rather have you begin to look at it from an individual basis. How do you get a person ready? Get them to the starting line, so when they do begin to review cases, they're doing it with a clean slate, as clean as it can be. It's not gonna be perfectly clean, but it can be clean if you focus in on ethics, Morality, biases, things like that, that is critical, especially when you start thinking about policing and the experiences that some groups have had and others have not. You have to be able to separate some of these things out. And this is something that I haven't heard in terms of the training that you actually present for PCOB and OIM personnel.

So one of the conversations that we do have as part of really any training that we do is an acknowledgement of the bias that we all bring to the table when people come to the work of oversight. You bring your own history, your experience. And sometimes it's not even, it's your community's history, your perceptions of one side or the other. And so we have conversations around bringing that and what that looks like as you bring it to the table, but then also acknowledging that you cannot do the work. You cannot come to the work of oversight and be for one side or the other. You have to be there for the process in order for it to work. And which is not an easy feat because people who come to this work often have very strong beliefs, convictions, experiences that all feed into who they are. And however, a lot of times that needs to be set to the side. can create a passion for the work, but it can't interfere with the actual process of oversight. That conversation is followed up with things like not only the trainings that Tina mentioned, but also we take investigative cases. We have an investigative training where we talk about best practices, not only in investigations, but also in the review of investigations, where we have an actual case, where we look at it from start to finish so that they can see not only how that should work, but also kind of pinpointing places where bias can start to creep in to the process. So those are some of the ways that we deal with it. I will say outside of training, another way that we have seen oversight entities start to kind of navigate some of the things that you've mentioned is to have very explicit things mentioned in their standard operating procedures that help guide the ethical conduct of the members of the board commission and oversight staff. And those can look many different ways. We've seen several of them Going in one direction or another, but a lot of times they guide not only the conduct within the setting of oversight and the actual work being done, but also things like social media, public comments, who can make them on behalf of the board, a little guidance on when you speak. and you're on the board, what does that, if you speak publicly, what does that look like? So there are lots of other ways to also address it beyond just the training that we've seen other cities engage in.

I'm going to leave it, you know, go with that. But, you know, I'm going to say, you know, this, that short of doing a lobotomy on someone, I do believe that any training, especially as it relates to policing, should have a curriculum, a training program in place that addresses these things such that the person at the conclusion of his or her training will come out with a new sense of what it means, okay, in terms of the work that they do and how their own personal biases can in so, so many ways influence, you know, how they address, how they look at, how they interpret, you know, a case that they receive. That's critical as far as I'm concerned. When I think about the sheer numbers of people who say this but they don't They don't admit or own up to their own biases. They don't admit or own up to, well, gee whiz, you know, just because they did this, this is the way I'm going to do this. That's dangerous. So I'm saying, once again, short of doing a lobotomy, I think there are other things that we can do to ensure that we have a group of people who see things as one, and they're coming out or drawing the same conclusion about the case, the merits of the case, that they are addressing. Thank you.

Thank you, Alder. Alderfield?

Thank you, Mayor. I have a couple of questions, and I want to first say I so appreciate the presentation and all the information that's been shared so far. It's really helped me not being very involved in how the oversight functions work, kind of process the tangibles and the standards here. For my first question, I was wondering if whoever is sharing their screen could please go back to the slide showing municipal percentage of budget, percentage of the police agency budget that goes to oversight earlier in the presentation.

Was it this one?

That is exactly the one. Yes, thank you. So I'm separately looking at an annual report that claims that NACL sets a lower bound of 2% of the budget of the entity that an oversight agency oversees and an upper bound of 5% of that agency budget. I'm wondering if you all can speak to those thresholds and how they're set, whether anybody meets those 2% and 5% thresholds. Is that NACOL's official guidance or does that come from somewhere else by NACOL?

So, Tina, did you want to answer that? Sorry to jump in.

No, I was just... I haven't seen that threshold, that range, but in the three years I've been here, but you've been here a lot longer, so.

Yeah, so I mean, so I know that there are people within NACL who talk about that range. And a lot of times it depends on the size of the city and what kind of range that a city ends up with. I will say that several years ago, the study that Tina pointed to several times and the one that this information is from is part of a larger report where the second half of the report talks about effective practices, and it goes specifically into this. We do recommend that there are thresholds that are established so that you can help commit to the financial stability of the oversight entity. The exact amount, the two to five, is not part of that report that I recall. So it is very possible, though. There are a lot of people within civilian oversight of law enforcement who have very strong opinions on this, and it's very possible that that's come from one of them.

Sure. Thank you. If anyone's following along, those thresholds are on page 53 of the 2025-26 annual report from our OIM. Second, I was wondering about within the OIM slides of the presentation later on, you all mentioned that oversight employees are generally subject to the same personnel policies. that apply to staff from other agencies, such as the policing agency they may oversee. Please correct me if I got any of that wrong first, but I was wondering if you've seen any oversight functions hosted within a municipal government where the employees in the oversight function are not protected by the same administrative policies and rights that are codified in municipal policy.

Yeah, so to be honest, looking at civilian oversight entities, I do not know any off of the top of my head that are not subject in some way or other or completely subject to the operating kind of the governing operational structure of the city that they sit within. Now, some examples of that, like Cleveland, who's often seen as one of the most, the way that the ordinance is written, it is a pretty structurally independent oversight entity. There's really nothing like it in the country. It gets its money, and then it has its own budgeting committee that then determines how that money will be spent. It has community grants that it gives out. It's a very different, in many ways, entity. I say that only to kind of emphasize that because all of these structures are a little different, You know, we have to kind of try to translate what that means into the next oversight entity. But with that said, even Cleveland, they are required to follow all city policies, civil service provisions and administrative directives. Now, they also have their own internal standard operating procedures that they follow that are free from obstruction from elected officials. But they still those sit within the policies that are the cities that they also have to follow. So most of those standard operating procedures are all internal to the work of civilian oversight of law enforcement, whether that's their investigation, their community engagement, the day-to-day operations of the office, those sit in their standard operating procedures, which then sit in the city's policies and procedures.

Thank you for that. In the same portion of the presentation, you shared that most boards don't supervise their police monitors. And in those cases, who does supervise those police monitors?

That is a great question. So in most cases, it's a mixed bag, to be honest. So we actually I'm looking at notes because we had a slide in there at one point in our presentation that kind of talked to this. So a lot of times it happens to be the appointing authority, whoever that is within a municipality. So in California. according to the study that was done by Scheibel on Tina's slides that she shared, this was the more recent study. There are those who are appointed by the mayor, there are those who are appointed by the city manager or by council, but in over half of all oversight entities, it's a combination. So there may be maybe in many cases, the board or commission is involved in the selection process. But the official appointment process is done by a combination or one of those entities that I just mentioned. And then the ultimate, there is some supervision that then happens by the appointing authority. Often the appointing authority also is the authority that can dismiss someone in that position as well.

Okay. Those are all my questions for now. Again, just gratitude. Thank you for joining us tonight.

Thanks for the questions. Thank you, Alder. Alder Mayer?

Thank you. Unless we need to refer to the screen again, could we get rid of the shared screen so we can see our guests a little bigger? Thank you. That's better. Thank you. Thank you again for this presentation. I do have a question. So you showed us that the top 100 cities in population 64 have a PCOB OIM. Is Madison one of those 64? Are we among that?

So I think that you dismissed the cutoff. I think you're in the, like you're number 79.

Okay. We're in the top 100 cities by population.

Okay, so probably. And so, let's see. I appreciated that you said, you know, that there's no two that are alike and there's many, many differences between them. Have you noticed kind of a trend towards standardization between all these different cities? Are they kind of moving? You said there's not best practices. You said something else, best something else.

Effectiveness.

Effectiveness, okay. Have you noticed a kind of trend towards that standardization?

So I will say, since we released the principles, the report where we laid out the principles of effective oversight, all 13 of them, along with the effective practices that result from them, we are seeing more and more people kind of driven towards trying to frame their oversight mechanism better. in that manner, at least with those in mind. So standardization is something that we're working on, but knowing that we probably will never come to complete standardization because of all the reasons that things end up being different in different cities, whether it's laws, agreements, contracts, or political will. But I would say we're getting better.

Good, good. And by any chance, do you have a nice spreadsheet that lists all the cities and the attributes so you can compare as far as, I mean, you had a number of numbers there with percent of budget and number of investigators. It'd be an amazing thing to be able to just, I like data, so it'd be great to see that way.

Yes, so we have one that's a bit dated. We are in the process of creating a new civilian oversight agency database that will do just that. We do have some information. to give, but with the caveat that it is a little dated. There are also, and Tina might be able to point you directly to some of these, there are, we're starting to see more studies done. The one that was done by Lani Scheibel out of the University of Colorado with us several years ago has a fairly comprehensive data set on oversight. Wouldn't you agree, Tina?

Yeah, but I don't know about the availability of the actual data set. That is something that the researcher retained, and we don't even have the data set. So, I mean, it's worth, if you're interested in it, reaching out to him. Yeah, we can share the report with you, which has his information and where he teaches. Another researcher... who worked in oversight that regularly updates the landscape of oversight, what are the issues that oversight entities face on an annual or yearly basis. She does an update each year, is Sharon Fairley. And she helped build out the oversight mechanism in Chicago. and is a law professor. And so I can send you the citation for her article as well. I know she's got two published. And so both Lonnie's and Sharon Fairley's are in our report that we issued. Those are the three. Sources of data that I use whenever there's a graphic or some data about how many of this or the comparison and the budgeting and all of that. Happy to send that. Those three.

Thank you. And my last question is about trying to reconcile independence with accountability. I think we're all accountable to somebody. Alders and the mayor are accountable to the voters every election. City staff, everyone has a boss going up the org chart. Even the OIM is accountable to the PCOB. But we've set up the PCOB to be independent as far as we have organizations that nominate people to that board. And I'm not concerned about the current PCOB. I've met many of them. They're qualified, competent people. But wanting to set them up for success, wondering what sorts of external oversight you've seen in other PCOBs to keep those groups on track, if there's any personnel issues and how to resolve that, and who they can appeal to when they need organizational oversight themselves.

I'm not sure I followed that question.

Well, it's just, I mean, every other one of our, we have the PCOB is unique in that all of our other committees and commissions either are appointed, you know, people by the mayor and then the council confirms. But the PCOB is unique in that we have external organizations nominate people to the PCOB and they're independent. But looking at, you know, future, having a future cohesive, who... If they ever have some organizational difficulty, I'm not quite sure how that would be resolved, except internally. And so I'm wondering other PCOBs in other cities, how they could get that, you know, the function of an HR or some oversight to help restructure it without the council. I mean, I guess the city, you know, we have oversight of the PCOB, but we still want them to have independence and not be meddling in things, micromanaging them. I don't know if I'm being clear on this. I guess we want them to be, I don't know, I might be going in the weeds a little bit.

So I think in many cities that we see, I know I mentioned more than once the standard operating procedures that boards and commissions often put together. In addition to kind of talking about how things work, how leadership is chosen, I mean, basic things like that, a lot of times it provides a roadmap for the expectations of individual members about their participation, their goals. behavior or the carrying out of the duty, and then also the repercussions when there is a violation of those procedures. So there is a way that there's something in writing that allows them to independently hold themselves to the standards that they've created. Now, in some cities, we see those SOPs get run by an appointing authority, sometimes by a council. Sometimes it's just voted on by a board or commission. It really depends on kind of the setup within the organization itself. or the city itself. But that is one of the ways that we see kind of the maintaining of independence, but still kind of developing a roadmap for success and accountability.

That helps. That helps. Thank you.

Thank you, Alder. Alder Madison.

Can you hear me? Sorry, I'm pissing myself off. I really am sleepy. Okay, so first I'm going to start with Alder Evers is out and sent a couple questions. And I'll just start with his. I think some of it is maybe answered, but just because I said I would ask. So he has what I believe is a two-part question. He asks, does NACO define independence to mean that all the police oversight office must function autonomously and is therefore not bound by the basic work rules that apply to all other city employees? Or to state it another way, the OIM claims that they are bound only by federal and state law contending strenuously that local guidelines and administrative rules are not binding and to consider them so would structurally undermine the office's independence. Does NACOL agree? So that's his first one there.

OK, Tina not taking her mute off means I'll answer that. So so as we mentioned with there's several different types of independence. And in my research, I really have not found anyone who is completely devoid of the responsibility of following independence. city policy. Now, that looks a little different in different cities, and particularly as it relates to how independent the oversight entity is in their ability to develop their own internal policies and procedures. A lot of times when we're looking at independence, I think one of the questions would be, how does something affect the work of oversight and the ability to be impartial, fair, and seen as legitimate in the work of oversight itself? So if there is a structure in place or a policy in place, how does that impede oversight? the work. A lot of times oversight entities are very concerned about, for instance, with their annual report. There are instances where they might give a first draft or a preview draft to Common Council or the mayor or the chief of police. And the act of asking them to change something before it is published for the community would be seen as an overstep of their independence. So that would be an example of kind of making sure that you were removing yourself from that piece. So that would impede the work of oversight in its efforts to be transparent and truthful in its assessments and its work and not be influenced by another entity in a way that affects the actual work of civilian oversight and carrying out the mandate.

Thank you. And here is his second, kind of long, so it's his second and last question. So he says, we seem to be at an impasse. The activist community claims Alders and the mayor are beholden to the police union, though most of us have never received or sought their endorsement. Meetings on the topic carry on a conspiratorial tone, arguing that Alders and the mayor are trying to destroy the OIM and the PCOB. The OIM is supporting this narrative. The divide is wide and the acrimony is over the top. There's been talk of a reset, but it hasn't happened yet. How do we overcome this divide? What would Nicole advise?

Hmm. I know it's a lot. That's pretty intense stuff right there. And so the work that we do, of course, training, technical assistance, with just that question and what all I got from that one question, there seems like there's probably some... issues going on that are beyond what we're able to help with. We've come across cities like this before in our work where we're doing training or technical assistance with them and then it comes to light and people are very honest about it in the oversight or in the cities that where the issue is with the oversight mechanism, that there are larger issues that no amount of training or the type of technical assistance we provide would help. And so in those cases, some of the cities have hired consultants or people who are skilled with mediation or doing a workplace assessment to identify what they can do to improve the internal dynamics, relations, the work processes. And so sometimes I've seen where cities took the step to contract with somebody who that is what they do. They work with organizations where there's tension, there's conflict to get them to a point where if nothing else, they can come to the table, let go of that tension. Because the reality is with the work of oversight, there has to be some level of trust or willingness to come to the table and set aside personal grievances, whatever the issues are. And otherwise, this work can just be stalled and can drastically affect the legitimacy of oversight in the city, can start having members of a community or different stakeholders question, do we even need this? Is it worthwhile to keep doing this? And so... If oversight wants to continue to exist, as difficult as it is, that kind of stuff, what I hear in that question, it's got to be addressed. And that is something that we don't offer in the forms of our technical assistance. But we do know, you know, some individuals who that's what they do. Matter of fact, I spoke earlier meeting today, spoke to individuals who will be presenting on restorative justice principles and practices at schools. a virtual conference like a one-day event that we're doing but we get a lot of requests from oversight offices about resorted restorative justice practices how do we implement these and what is oftentimes an adversarial setting also on trauma-informed practices how do we implement this when so much of the community we're working with Is directly impacted or historically, you know, just historically and present day have Our targets, just to be very blunt when it comes to policing and various aspects of policing. So, yeah, but if that is something you all would like some recommendations about who might be able to help in that regard, we're happy to offer. But yeah, that is, I would say, and correct me if I'm wrong, Cammie, but okay. Okay.

Sorry. Now I have my own couple of questions. And I this one and I also, as I'm saying is, I want to say that I personally am not calling into question your expertise at all with what I am going to ask. But because I'm a fan of legitimacy, like you all are saying, trust, transparency. And I really am not a fan of conspiracies, like with the exception of some TV shows, you know, that I can't pay attention to. I'm just not a fan. So there was a public statement while we've been here, and I just want to go back to our meeting on how we booked this because I think it's important for the community to hear it. So the statement is, while she never admitted, Council President Madison has finally taken our advice and arranged for someone from a trusted police oversight org, NACO, to speak to the council tonight. So I'm going to stop there. So if I remember our meeting correctly, because I am 47 now, In our meeting, I attended the June 18th PCOB meeting. You all did not present at that meeting. It was a different group. But in that conversation that I had with Lauren, who did present on 618, we had a really great conversation. And she, you know, after that conversation, I was like, you know, let me also meet with NACO because I can be very nerdy. I always have a ton of questions, and I have follow-up questions for those questions, right? And in our meeting, I remember asking you all whether or not you presented to the Common Council, like, because I know since I've been here, I've not heard from NACO. And I believe you shared that NACO had not previously presented to the whole body, or at least to this body. So if you could just clarify that, is that your memory of the meeting? I did not come to you because I was referred by someone else. It was more so me nerding out and wanting to hear more from you all, what you all do, how you inform and teach about these bodies.

Yeah, so that's correct. We have presented to the PCOB, both Tina and I at separate occasions have done training for them, pretty extensive training, but we have never presented before. to my recollection, to the full Common Council ever.

Thank you. And then the second part of this, it says, we have no idea who this person is. We know who NACO's president is. She has a ton of investigative experience and would be a great resource for all things OIM PCOB. So I don't know whether or not your president knows you're here, but if you would let us know whether or not your president knows you're here, and if you wouldn't mind just sharing your background. Both presenters.

Yeah. So, yes, our president, Florence Finkel, does know that we're here. I actually talked to her about it today. And Flo and I have known each other for years. several decades now from being in the oversight world. She does have investigative experience. She's worked for some time at the New York City CCRB, eventually as its executive director for a period of time. So as far as my background is concerned, I came to civilian oversight in 1998 as a member, an appointed member of a civilian review board. I had been appointed as a member of the community who was concerned about the actions of police in my city. And and quickly learned that while I had the best of intentions, I had very little of the knowledge I needed to be fully successful in the effort of being a civilian review board member. So it just happens that one of the founders of NACL was also the executive director of the board on which I served. And so I had a quick knowledge and introduction to NACoL and realized that it would be an excellent place for the type of training that not only board and commission members, but oversight agency staff could find the training that they needed could be found there. And so since 1998, I've been working with the organization with many different hats on to help develop training and kind of further the work of civilian oversight and the development of effective oversight throughout the country.

Thank you.

Tina?

Yeah. And I'll just stick to what's pertinent to the work that I'm doing in oversight. So I am the director of training and education. Been with Nicole for three years now. Actually, mid-August will be my three year anniversary. Before that, I was a professor of social work in Maryland, as well as in the North Carolina system. And it was during the time period when I was a professor of social work in North Carolina that I happened to move to a city. that I recognized within a very short period of time had a very high number of police killings. And I thought, wow, this seems to happen way more frequently than any place else I've lived, and I've lived in much larger cities. So being a data person, I calculated, I found out what the numbers were, how many people were being killed by police, and I calculated the rates for that city and compare them to cities of comparable sizes and realize there is in fact a much higher rate of police individuals being killed by police in that city. At that point, I've always been active in my communities where I live So at that point, I kept my eyes and ears open, started to look out if there was anybody else in the city that was working on this issue, because I figured there's got to be someone else, other folks who have noticed this. It's not just me. And I actually found two people who were working in tandem on this issue, and I joined forces with them. And so over the next two years, at that point, we did what we needed to do to educate the community, educate city council, to advocate for civilian oversight of law enforcement in the city. We platformed individuals who had been directly impacted by police misconduct and police violence. We highlighted and platformed their family members. And so over a two year period, there was a lot of legwork, a lot of effort, a lot of organizing, but we actually were successful in the city passing an ordinance for civilian oversight of law enforcement. So that was my introduction to civilian oversight of law enforcement. I had actually never even heard of NACOL until we started working on that issue. That's when I, my small group of the two other members and I, we started researching and came across NACOL online and took advantage of some of the trainings that they offered. And because of those trainings, we were able to do the work that we did in the community.

Thank you. Oops, sorry.

No, just a couple years later, I did not know I would actually be working with Nicole, but here I am.

Well, I appreciate you here. It's been great learning from you. This is my last one on this one, then I'll come back so other audits can go. But the last part of the statement talks about mistrust and distrust, I guess, about why we're asking you to present. I didn't give you a resume when I reserved the meeting with you, but as Common Council President, one of my responsibilities is to organized presentations and trainings for the full body. And if I remember correctly in our meeting, I talked about, you know, just some of the challenges we're having here, trying to understand it all, hope it makes sense. I'm not sure if I share with you all, but I'm very process oriented. But I guess the last thing I guess I want to ask you is, you could be very transparent. If you're like, Sabrina, you were there and I felt like you were a blah, blah, blah, blah, go for it, you say it. But I just want to get because, again, it's not really about for me. It's for the community to hear why we wanted you to come tonight and what that conversation was like in booking you. So I'm OK with you being transparent about the conversation. Don't bother me at all. So what I'm asking you is that did you get from us that. There were some I don't even know what the I don't know, because my brain don't operate in this conspiracy sort of way. But I guess what is your why did you say yes to come here? I guess maybe that'll help. Why did you say yes to the presentation? I don't know if you would have turned us down, like what might have got you to turn us down or I don't know how your decision making happens.

So so I would so. My understanding is that we were coming here tonight so that the Common Council, who is considering amendments, will be considering amendments, has been talking about the oversight structure, could have a better understanding of civilian oversight before they entered into any more conversations. Yes. And I can say, I think. Correct me if you feel differently, Tina. I don't feel we would have turned this down. I feel like the opportunity we rarely get. an elected body who wants to learn this much about civilian oversight that where we get asked, I mean, honestly, I can't assess how each, you know, one of you feels about learning about this. And, you know, some of you are, some of you may be like, when are they going to leave? But the, the, But I would never miss an opportunity to try to educate any stakeholder group of which you are one about civilian oversight. I mean, that's that's kind of my I mean, this is what we do. And the more people listen to it, the better.

And I'll add to that. More often than not, when we do a presentation that involves a city council, it's been organized and arranged by the border commission. So the border commission requests the training, and they invite the city council members to attend so that everyone hears the same thing at the same time. Yeah, I don't know if we've ever turned down an opportunity to. I haven't in my three years. If I'm contacted by or Nicole is contacted by boards commission, the oversight staff, whether it's the director of an office or the head of an office or someone within the office requesting training on specific things. And so it's. If we're if it's in our wheelhouse and we're able to provide the training on it, then we will. So it's pretty straightforward. Someone reaches out to us. We meet to find out what it is they want the training on or the assistance if it's assistance. And then we go from there. We develop what we think would be helpful for them.

And I just want to say again, I appreciate you all for coming tonight. And again, this presentation was paid for through Common Council dollars, budgets, not another budget. I just want to make sure I reiterate that. Thank you. I'm sorry, Mayor. I'll come back with others.

Thank you, Alder. Alder Redever.

Thank you. And thank you for staying with us for so long. Again, this has been very informative. And many of my colleagues have already asked many of my questions. So I only have a few left. So I just wanted to clarify, my understanding, and I'm certainly not an expert, is that we are either the only city or one of the very few cities that has chosen to implement independent monitoring without a consent decree. Am I correct in that?

No, there's quite a few actually that have independent monitor that do not have.

OK, so we're not that unique.

Yeah, I mean, there I mean, you're not one of thousands, that's for sure. But there are quite a few cities, you know. I can think of a few off the top of my head and they may not be called monitor. The monitor model is part of kind of includes and encompasses anything that might be an independent auditor or an inspector general. So it's it's you have a lot of company in that model. OK, great.

One of the things that has been a source of challenge is this term unfettered access. And you all used that term. And I think what's difficult is to know what does that really mean in real life, understanding that. There is an absolute need to protect personally identifiable information and to have safeguards in place for that data transfer and how data is handled. So when someone says unfettered access, can you give a lay person's perspective of what you mean when you say that?

Well, it's as much direct access or access to the information that's needed to carry out whatever the work that's mandated to do. And so within that, of course, there always has to be Everyone has to abide by whatever rules or laws are in place regarding confidentiality, the exchange of information, the security of the information as far as how it's accessed or, you know, everything. Essentially, all policies, laws have to be respected and honored. Yeah. The level of access is going to vary depending on what the oversight function is. And so, for example, even if an oversight mechanism in a city has both an investigator, say there's all three, an auditor, an investigator, as well as a board member. um they have different roles and they and so the level of access that they will have um when it comes to unfettered access will be dependent on their roles and their authorities and so the person who's tasked with reviewing completed investigations um ideally they would have the access to anything you know of course the investigative file, any evidence or transcripts that are available as a part of the file so that they themselves can actually see the evidence, the information, and make their own judgment about that. Now, if you go to the auditor for the same oversight mechanisms, that review Those who are tasked with reviewing the cases only, they're not going to have the same level of access to or as the auditor or monitor is going to have. An auditor or monitor has much broader range of authority. And so because of the nature of what they're responsible for doing, the policies, procedures, again, this depends. their task with doing work that goes beyond just anything to do with misconduct complaints. It can be about who's training the officers, what are the training requirements, personnel policies and procedures. The unfettered access would be whatever allowable by law they can have the most direct access to, whether it's the back end of databases regarding misconduct or it's the policies and procedures of personnel. So unfettered, I guess in the simplest of terms, I think of it as unfettered access is the most direct access and easy access to information or individuals that is permissible by law.

You mentioned that one of the things that was a responsibility of an oversight board was evaluating the effectiveness of the overall office of the, in this case, independent monitor. And I thought that I caught you saying that our current ordinance does not have that in place. And I am not sure that I caught that correctly. So could you clarify that?

No, I believe it does have it in place. It does have it in place. Okay, great.

But the question is, are we actually undertaking that evaluation of effectiveness and how are we doing it? Is that?

That I don't have an answer for. I don't know the extent to how that's been carried out so far.

Great. I think that is all my questions. Thank you so much.

Thank you, Alder. Alder Glenn.

Thank you, Mayor. There's been a lot of talk about some changes that may be seen to be needed. This office is six years old and those changes haven't been asked for until recently, as of April. And with the ordinance as it is, adding in a level of oversight, I think there's an argument happening between community and council on if that lessens the independence. And council says no, and community says yes. If we add something to the ordinance that puts them more inside of any kind of restrictions or changes, it feels like that would be lessening the independence of a six-year-old ordinance. And just from your professional opinion, if we add restrictive language that feels them following rules of either APMs or anything outside of state and federal laws that they have been following for six years. To me, that sounds like restriction. I don't know how else. In your professional opinion, adding something to this ordinance that you have looked at, you've had the pleasure of reviewing because you gave us a presentation on, adding something to it that limits in any way would be limiting, correct?

So without seeing the exact language of what you're proposing, it's hard for me to answer that with any certainty. I will say I do feel that looking at something and deciding whether it is restrictive or if it's clarifying is one of the ways that I often look at language. when in any city for any kind of proposal, does this limit civilian oversight or does it clarify the role or the duties or the responsibilities? I can't say whether it's either one of those things without really looking at the language and hearing the, the intent behind it. But I do think that those two things are a very important perspectives to, to take in regardless of the type of language. I mean, often I find, I mean, when an oversight ordinance gets talked about being opened up and, and and kind of messed with or not that's not the right word but um altered in any way you just i do get a little tense and wonder what what could happen um but i think it's about stepping back and looking at the language and seeing if this is something that is going to alter the functionality of an oversight entity, or is it something that will clarify the role and in the end help it?

What was the other word you used for clarify? It was clarify or? Restricted, thank you.

The function? Um, so yeah, so I'm not in my professional opinion, giving you an actual professional opinion. Yes. Yes.

No, you use two really good words that I think kind of really sit with where we're at. Yes. That's all I wanted to write them down. Okay. Um, based on like your 13 point, I got to put my glasses on.

I can't see.

Um, um, There was another piece that ours kind of falls in a gap around, around confidentiality, anonymity, and anti-retaliation. In ours under nine, it covers confidentiality of investigation records, no anti-retaliation clauses in ours for complainants or cooperating officers. Do you think that that's important?

I do think it adds a level of support and protection for those who are filing complaints and being willingly a part of the investigative process. We find that in many communities, people are fearful of coming forward, whether because of their own experience or their perception of the experience or stories of others' experiences. And so having those in place can be very helpful to make sure that people feel comfortable with coming forward. And I feel the same way about the anonymity. Now, I will say anonymity makes it very hard to actually investigate a complaint, but it does provide an avenue for complainants to come forward so that you know that those complaints exist, even if you cannot carry out the investigation to its completion, if you don't have all of the information you need.

That is very good information. Thank you. Just a couple more little areas from your 13 points. Access to executives and public declination responses. Ours has it in there where if the MPD declines to investigate, that they get to do it in written, but you recommend it should be public. Correct? Yes.

Yeah. Yeah. As much as possible, if it's, again, legally permissible, because this process is. A big part of having oversight is establishing trust in policing, bettering police and community relations. And so if there are parts of a process that are opaque, then that does not go towards the goal of improving that relationship and providing transparency to the process in the first place. And so, yes, during our trainings, we do talk about having as much as possible, whether it's the data that's produced, the work that's produced, but also the process of investigating complaints. Not only the outcome of if you're reviewing a case or investigating a case, what was your finding? The public should know that. What was your recommendation regarding your finding? What was the police department's response to that? As a matter of fact, there are some agencies that have public online tracking systems regarding each individual case and what the status is, what the recommendations are, what the police chief's response to it has been. And additionally, there are some public publicly available online tracking systems for policy recommendations, too. So not just not just the where the status of a case and the outcome of a case, but what are the What are the policy recommendations and whether or not they were implemented or accepted by the police department? And so that is pretty kind of common and standard to provide that type of information. And so we do think it's a good idea to meet the overall aims of oversight in the first place, why oversight exists.

Thank you. And then just one last one. Earlier when you were talking about independent counsel and, right, like there are independent monitors and PCOBs that use city attorneys, but has there Is that been talked about as best practice? Or is there been an ongoing issue and push to not have that be? I was reading a report that was out a while ago, really digging into that around you all of like, it being an ongoing issue with having city attorneys.

So often what we see is so not every civilian oversight entity has access to independent counsel, whether it's through ordinance or financially. And so a lot of times what we see is that. It makes sense that there is access to independent counsel for when there is a conflict of interest. I mean, when you have a city attorney who represents the office itself, not necessarily the one attorney, often represents many aspects of the city, including the police department. And so... It's back to kind of sometimes it's just perception is that it is hard to believe that there isn't a conflict when you have an office that represents both sides of an issue. That does not mean that there's any impropriety there. But there's often the perception that there is a conflict that exists. And so and and sometimes in cities we see that there is an actual conflict. And so having independent counsel helps resolve some of those issues. There are other there are probably many more. oversight entities that have the ability to contract independent counsel when that issue arises. And often it is not outlined. They get to choose where the conflict is that they believe needs independent counsel. They are often kind of restricted by a budgetary line item for that, but they often get to choose. What we do see is a lot of times, I mean, there's some issues that come up, like when there's a FOIA request or a question about open meeting laws, like just something about Robert's Rules of Order that often city attorneys are, or county attorneys for that matter, are kind of the go-to because it's a fairly... common question, a common procedure and not much wiggle room in an open meeting law. Um, so, um, so that's kind of how that's handled. Now, if I could wave my wand and give every oversight entity independent counsel, just to relieve the perception issue alone, I would. Um, but I also know that kind of the reality that we live in, um, and, um, That's why I kind of answer it that way, that there are ways to make sure that you have it when you need it and that where you can rely on something at other times.

I just, because of that, and you brought it up. So it is really important to have a stable budget, correct? Like whatever that is, to have stability in it, not year to year, have things taken from it, correct? Correct. I just want to say thank you very much for your presentation and coming here. I know that we've kept you here a long time. And this has been, I think, really informative for everyone. Thank you.

Thank you, Alder. Alder Harrington McKinney.

Thank you, Madam Mayor. I want to thank you for your presentation because, not because, but I wish that this presentation had happened in the forefront rather than at the end. And for transparency's sake, I was one of the three alders who supported moving monies of funding from the office to support body-worn cameras. And in your presentation, I realized that those are two totally different conversations. And I have a couple of things that, no, I have a few things I want to ask, because it's very important for me to better understand. From one of my reasons for supporting the movement of money, over a six-year period, there was underspending by that department, and funds in that excess was transferred to the Rainy Day Fund. And so that was challenging to me. But in your slide, especially the slide that looked at, and I don't know which slide it was, but it really talked about the slides which had to be in place. But in that slide, I picked up adequate funding, operational resources, lack of long-term staffing, the analytical needs of the office and building capacity. And based on your presentation of oversight indices, how was, not how, but was Madison really ready and prepared to support the oversight function that it promised the residents of the city were we prepared do we have things in place to really have a well-functioning oversight board And if that is the case, do we have still the opportunity to really, what is missing, what would be missing to make us have what we promised the citizens of Madison when this was originally formed?

I think that goes back to how I responded to an earlier question. That requires a lot more information that I'm aware of or we're aware of. I have no idea what the budget is. I don't know what the expectations were when this was created. And so I think without doing an assessment of that and doing some research and talking to folks like key stakeholders who were around during that time, I don't think we're equipped to answer that, or I am.

So, no, I'm not asking. What I'm asking is how important it is to have those things in place. You can't answer that based upon the entities that you have had experience with. I'm not asking you about that, but what I'm specifically asking is how important it is And what is the impact of having budgets and all those things in alignment that will have a successful program?

So one of the challenges of oversight, particularly with a brand new entity, is that you're putting it into a city structure that never had anything like it before. And there is really nothing else in city government like a civilian oversight agency. No matter what model you put in with what authorities, it's a very different organization or entity within the structure than you've probably ever had before. And so it takes time to set it up. There are I don't know a city Off the top of my head, I'm sure there's one that I'd love to give credit to that got everything right the first time. Because there are these 13 principles and the 70 some effective practices that go with them. And no one has all of them. But they quickly realized, well, that might have helped or this is more important or maybe this wasn't as important as we thought it was and we should have moved this forward. So I think that... Regardless of the circumstance and the structure, a new entity takes time to stand up. I do think that there are things that are important elements of your structure that might have caused additional delay. Like for instance, a lot of times the monitor comes first and then the board comes. So you've got someone who's simultaneously setting up an office and doing all of those things while the board is being seated. But that's not how your oversight entity works. So there's extra time involved. There are training needs. And sometimes in the first round, maybe... there's a learning curve for what training is actually needed for the next round. Having been the one that worked with the first board, sometimes with a board, it takes a while for them to learn how to work through a system that they also have never worked in before. And so all of those things kind of set up something for a slow moving pace. That does not mean that you cannot be successful now at all. You have an opportunity to provide substantial support to the entity, make some changes to help with the effectiveness and the overall work of the entity. to be able to work collaboratively with all stakeholders, including the Office of the Independent Monitor and the PCOB, to bring about some changes that, in the end, create an even better, more effective policy. And that might not be with one change at all. That could be just the collaborative support or some of the support that Tina mentioned in response to one of the questions that kind of talked to the underlying issues that also exist. um, about, um, people's distrust of one side or the other. So there's definitely some things that need to be worked on, um, whether that is actual changes to the ordinance or that is working on bringing everybody to the table, um, to develop a level of trust that helps the work move forward. Um, all of those things are going to help breed success, um, for the a lot of different people having a lot of different conversations and some additional research on what step is next.

My final question is this. Can an effective Office of Independent Monitor have a success without having body one cameras as a part of the effectiveness of the work that is envisioned for them to do, for that office to do.

I think it would be ideal if that existed, because as Kami mentioned earlier, that is another account of what happened. It's not relying on anybody's reporting of what happened. It is actual footage of an incident, if it's available. Now, are there oversight bodies that don't have access to body worn cameras? Yes. And so I think it does limit them in ways that oversight offices that have that access, you know, just because without that, there's a reliance on different versions of what happened in the interaction. And that's always gonna come through the lens of the person, whether it's the complainant, whether it's a witness, whether it's the subject officer. So there may very well be variations in the story. With body-worn camera footage, that is the most objective story that I think is gonna be available in an investigation such as these. So I think, go ahead, Kami.

I was going to say, the interesting part of that is that before body-worn cameras came online, there were lots of oversight entities doing lots of really good work through investigation of allegations. But now they have another tool in many cities that help them do them in the ways that Tina just outlined. It doesn't mean that there aren't people doing great work where they don't have access to that technology. But I would venture to guess that those who do have it, it's more information that feeds into the investigations.

Yeah, and that is relevant to the misconduct investigations and the review of cases and even aspects of the monitoring duties. But don't forget, like with a monitor, there is a lot more the scope of work that a monitor is able to do that goes beyond monitoring. the work that's specifically regarding misconduct cases. Like it's the policies, the procedures, it's hiring practices, training practices. So it is the whole breadth of what a police department, a much wider breadth of what a police department is doing. And so that is equally important as well.

Thank you, that completes my questions.

Thank you, Alder. Alder Pritchett, additional questions?

Yes. There's an elephant in this room. And what I want to do is to talk about, you talked about relationships. Relationships between the OIM and the relationship with the PCOB. And I want to know, because it bears on questions related to ethics, it relates to the necessity to recuse oneself, et cetera. Having said that, right now I think we are at an impasse. And maybe I shouldn't say we, let me just say I. in terms of having lost trust in both the PCOB as well as the OIM, primarily because of one or both not recusing themselves for something that I consider to be essential to oversight. I say that primarily because when I think about a young person who does this or that and has an encounter with the police, and now we have a person who chairs the PCOB who has had an encounter with the police. And I think about that behavior and what that behavior can potentially do to that young person and or any other person who has an encounter, especially with respect to outcome. So I need to know from you when and where and how should an OIM recuse him or herself from a case that involves the very, very group that's supposed to supervise them.

So I am peripherally aware of what you are talking about. And so I, but I do not have any of the actual facts of any of it. So I can't probably give you the determination that you would like for me to give. I can tell you though, back to what Tina had talked about in her presentation, that well, and that we'd mentioned as well, that I had mentioned as well, that building legitimacy and setting expectations and creating an environment of trust is some of the hardest work that an oversight entity does. And so it is really important for an oversight entity to keep in mind, not only, the reality of situations, but the perception of them. And meeting those head on, realizing that often perception becomes reality. whether it is the reality to start with or not. So those are very important considerations for oversight in any community. Every community deals with some incident or other where they can be perceived to be in conflict of interest, the same way that we talked about the attorneys earlier, that sometimes it can be a perception of conflict that becomes the reality, whether or not it was the reality it began with. Again, I only know things about this specific incident in a way that does not make me feel comfortable of coming up with a very clear answer for you. But I do think it's important for everyone to always consider how anything affects the long-term legitimacy and building of trust within an oversight agency.

Even though you don't have access to all of the information, let's just look at recusals. Are there times when one must recuse him or herself?

So, I mean, the answer to that is, of course, there are times when people would need to recuse themselves. I cannot tell you without additional information if this is one of those times, without having all of the information in front of me.

You know, I'm asking that question, you know, primarily because, you know, here, you know, the PCOB and OIM offices, you know, still in its infancy. And if one wants this to really, really work, you know, we've got to get these skeletons out of the closet. We've got to find the dead bodies. And we're going to have to really, really, really beat honest about what it is that we do, why we do it, and the necessity for at least maintaining a level of integrity. Because right now, integrity is gone. It's gone. How do you restore that? How do you restore trust when it has been so severely violated?

Alder, I think our guests answered that in response to one of Alder Evers' questions that Alder Madison read. Thank you, Alder. Alder Madison, additional questions?

Yes, and I'll be very brief. It's more so a clarifying question. Before I was Common Council President, I know we talk about political will sometimes when it comes to the office. I worked to restore some funding for a position in the office. When I was Common Council President, you end up hearing about some challenges where you wouldn't have heard about it. before I was Common Council President. So in one of your slides, I think you were going over the org, and she says the PCOB appoints supervisors and evaluates the monitor. Well, I guess I just want to make sure I clarify So if the office can't come to a solution, you know, like the PCLB, I don't know whether I think we're brought into it or not. I could just see that there was not a response from the chair and maybe something was up and we didn't hear back from her. But anyways, Common Council leadership, myself and Vice President Glenn were brought into that conversation. But I guess I just want to make sure I understand your understanding of the ordinance where it comes to It seems like the ordinance, my understanding is that the PCOB executive committee maybe and the chair would help to mediate any challenges that would not force or push leadership to be involved, if that makes sense. But when that doesn't happen, then leadership has to be involved or is brought into it. Does that make sense? I just want to make sure I understand your understanding of what exactly is How do you understand the supervision part is what I'm trying to get at.

So the ordinance is fairly clear on the fact that the PCOB and the executive committee supervise the office of the independent monitor. Well, the monitor then has supervision powers over the office itself. It is not clear on what happens afterwards. If there is a breakdown there, there's no additional language that says what happens next. Gotcha.

So that, so when you mentioned, I'm sorry, y'all, I just have a follow up thing because my brain needs it. So then when you talk about like the restrictive versus clarifying, then I, I'm also for myself, I'm also thinking about how does this work? because there is no clarification on a breakdown is what you're saying. Like it doesn't say what happens if there's a breakdown. We don't have that in there. You didn't see it.

No, no. Okay. Yeah, there is no, there's nothing about dispute resolution in the ordinance. Thank you.

Thank you, Elder.

Elder Figueroa-Cole. Thank you. Thank you both for being here. I really, really appreciate it. It's kind of late already, but I have a couple clarifying questions, and I may have an answer for all the Madison, but I'll touch on that at some other point because I just want to get to my questions. So I have read, reviewed, dissected these ordinances multiple times. I had... Yeah, I have read it many, many times. And as you guys were sharing some of your feedback, there are things that kind of spoke to me or jump at me. And one of those that I want clarification to make sure that I understand it correctly is like you mentioned that authority should be in writing. So to me that means, which is what I've been saying, this is one of the reasons why I sponsor these changes, if it's not in writing, it's not happening. So what I think I heard you say is that authority should be in writing because that just creates that trust that we are so much looking for this clarity and there is a precise understanding on who's playing what role. Is that a fair understanding of what you were trying to share with us?

Having them in writing helps to minimize confusion. Correct. Or in the example that you all or Kami just responded to about, there is no language in the ordinance about what happens if there's an issue. And so it would be helpful to have something to refer to so that everybody is clear. Perfect. Otherwise, you're in the position that you're in, like not knowing what's supposed to happen, who's supposed to do what.

Correct, thank you. And then another thing that also is something that I have discussed with multiple people, it is okay and it should be expected for changes to happen periodically on any ordinance, including this one. It's a work in progress, things change, and there are things that may be out of date, and we should be able to feel free to make those changes. I think that's what I heard from you guys. And then the question that I... that has been on my mind, it's in regards to the fairness of process and the perception versus reality. Can you summarize for us how the role of advocacy versus oversight impacts building that trust that we're trying to build? Is there a difference between oversight and advocacy?

I think to a certain extent, you know, whether you're, if you're an oversight, you, you know, in the work that you're doing, just the, even stated in a lot of ordinances and guiding documents, right? There is a oversight exists for transparency purposes, for accountability purposes. This is pretty common in standard language among all kinds of oversight. So when you say advocacy advocacy, in the terms of advocating for transparency, oversight, I guess, in the work day to day that is done. People can be viewed as being advocates for those things. Advocacy in terms of I guess I feel like I need a little bit more time.

Okay, so let me rephrase the question. So in terms of I am working on a case and I did an investigation and I'm competing with that, and then I declare that I'm now the advocate for the families, I mean, does that have an impact on how legit your, keep yourself, your bias down, or does it have an impact on your credibility? We all wear different hats. And as an elder, we all hear most of us because we want to advocate for our people. But we also understand that in our role, we have certain responsibilities that we have to follow. state laws that we have to obey by that impact, you know, the advocacy part of it. So how does that, in this work that is so important for you to create that trust, how does declaring yourself an advocate of the victims impacts the work of the oversight?

I can... So I have a sense that there's other information here that we don't have, but I will say this. So there are many oversight agencies who, as they are working with people who come in, who have complaints, who have had something happen to them, and they have the ability to refer them to other services so that they can get the help that they need. I mean, a lot of people come in, whether it's trauma from... the experience they just had or something previous. Oversight tends to be a way to get them to someone who their entire work is to help them in that sense. A lot of times they don't become the advocate themselves because they want to make sure that they are making sure that they're there for the process and and any kind of work. could possibly make them be perceived to be biased in one way or the other. And when there is an investigation or a review investigation, that perception can be very important in how the outcome of that investigation is perceived, which is something you want to make sure for the person who came in and um had the incident and needs um the assistance you want to make sure that they get a fair um investigation and complaint process. So I realize it's not really an answer to your specific question, but just knowing how other oversight entities often handle those who need additional services, hopefully that's helpful.

So on my last question then, because perception keeps on coming up. So wouldn't you say that a way to Eliminate or to reduce the perception perception issue is to have a standard operating procedures within the board to address how the advocacy happens versus Versus how they like for example we have the ordinance list the duties of the OIM I don't I couldn't find it where advocacy and their duties so I'm also believe that The duties are, when we talk about the duties, it's what the ordinance calls for the duties, so that person should stick to that. So wouldn't it send operating procedures created by the board on how they manage that advocacy will help reduce the perception and the bias? Like it's ahead of time how people can expect what is going to happen if someone needs resources?

So there should be standard operating procedures that outline the process.

Yes.

Whatever that process happens to be, it needs to be clear and concise and consistent so that people know what to expect.

Exactly. Yeah, those are my questions. Thank you again for being here. I really appreciate it. Thank you, Alder. Alder Ugeir.

Thank you, Mayor. And let me add my thanks, Cameron, Tina, for the presentation and your professional handling of the many questions we have had for you tonight. I only have one, and hopefully it'll be simple. This is engendered, Tina, by your story about your personal journey down in the Carolinas. I assume that one of the things that oversight bodies regularly do, or at least have done, is identify statistical situations where There's just the appearance of prejudice of some sort of profiling that may not be the result of malfeasance or policy violation or intentional violations of civil rights. They just may be something that's really subtle that's ingrained in our systems and so forth. But deserves some kind of attention. In our case, this may be differences in citations versus warnings for disorderly conduct investigations or what appears to be some kind of profiling with regard to traffic stops. Have you seen with your Nicole members, particularly those that have been established for a while, success in getting to the bottom of those of having constructive discussions with police or their commissions that result in what you could call demonstrable success, new training regimens or restored trust with the communities that are noticing those kinds of discrepancies.

I know, well, I know that the New York City CCRB, as well as some jurisdictions in California, they actually have, these are some larger entities, but they actually have units of policy researcher folks who actually focus on this type of data, that they collect these type of data for the purposes of looking out for any patterns in traffic stops, in uses of force, in arrest. And so they focus specifically on race and ethnicity in these types of cases. And so the idea is they track the data, they analyze the data, they identify whether or not they think there is an issue that needs to be looked into, or there needs to be some policy changes around. And so it all starts with the data, though you are correct. People can feel or think one thing, but until you have objective information in these cases, the data are available because the police departments keep track of it. So. It does start with data. Now, I know these units exist. I don't keep track with or keep up with them regularly, but I know they do exist for the purpose of identifying any potential areas where recommendations and policy and practice need to be made for the police department.

Thank you.

Thank you, Alder. Alder Pritchett, additional questions?

I want to piggyback on what Alder Ugar said about, and this deals primarily with the disparities when we start looking at arrests. Do you think, believe that it's prudent to also look at economics as far as looking at arrests. Now, I say that primarily because when we look at, for example, the sheer numbers of arrests that are made for, let's say, drugs, crack, cocaine, whatever, I know here in Wisconsin, for example, that fishing, there are two types of fishing in Wisconsin. One type of fishing is for sport. The other type of fishing is for economics. Now, when you find that the number of arrests that occur amongst black individuals. Those arrests are primarily economic. When you cannot get a job, you resort to any kind of activity that will get you money. And that's dealing drugs. That's the quickest way to get money to put food on your table, et cetera. So when we start looking at disparities and we start looking at arrests, I think we have to be mindful of sometimes causation. And that too often is not done. Alder, I think we're a little far from civilian oversight. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Alder. I have no other alders in the queue with questions. So let me say a very hearty thank you to our guests for your presentation and your enormous patience in answering very many questions from the council. And we very much appreciate your time. If you could hear us, we would be giving you a round of applause. We really do appreciate you taking the time to be here and to answer all these questions. And we look forward to your presentation being made available to the council and to the public. And I believe there is a couple of other resources that you would forward to us. Again, appreciation for that in advance. And with that, I think we can let you go to a well-deserved rest. Thank you both very much.

Thank you for having us. Thank you all so much. Have a good night.

All right. That brings us to the end of our agenda. Alder Martinez-Rutherford, it is your turn.

I would herefore too like to add that, please, I move that we adjourn.

And moved and seconded to adjourn. Is there any objection to recording unanimous vote in favor of adjournment? Seeing no objection, we stand adjourned. Have a good evening, everyone.