Sausalito, on the Record · Part 3 of 3 · The Money

Why a Rich Town Keeps Learning Late What It Spent

Over ten years, budgets that together planned to break even left Sausalito’s main fund $13.5 million richer. Since mid-2021 its finance office has changed hands five times, and in fiscal 2024-25 the city spent more than the council had approved on 14 budget lines. An outside review of the former finance director’s city laptop found no sign of fraud.

Map: one dot per building in the City of Sausalito, from OpenStreetMap (© OpenStreetMap contributors). Gold marks the place a moment is about; a wide ring means the whole town.

At a Glance
$24.7M
fund balance of the city’s main fund on June 30, 2025
$1,365,243
spent over budget on 14 lines in one year
5
times the finance office changed hands since mid-2021
The finding
Over ten years, the city’s final amended budgets together planned for its main fund to lose $56,568, and the audits show it gained $13,507,115 instead.

On Feb. 17, 2026, with a draft of the city’s audit on the table, Councilmember Jill Hoffman asked for a forensic audit, and Mayor Steven Woodside began his answer with a warning to himself. “I’m going to say something now that I may regret,” he said, before telling her that all five council members knew there was no evidence of fraud, “not just from this auditor,” but from “an intense independent investigation that was conducted contemporaneously that we’re not at liberty to discuss except to say there was no evidence of fraud.” Hoffman pushed back. “We did not do that investigation,” she said. “We didn’t do it. We did a different kind of investigation that did not show that type of evidence.”

For all of that, Sausalito is not short of money: the city’s main fund ended June 2025 with a fund balance, assets minus liabilities, of $24,686,605.1 For this part of the series we read ten years of Sausalito’s audits alongside the meetings where they were presented, and what they describe is a city with plenty of money and a persistent difficulty knowing, in time to act on it, what that money is doing.

Part 1 followed the landslide to an insurance bill, six landslide claims with $6.7 million in incurred losses2 and a notice of default from the pool that insures the city,3 and Part 2 ended on a waterfront where a marina’s lease4 and a 294-apartment filing moved outside the ballot’s reach. This part turns to the office that keeps the city’s books, which is where the cost of risks like the hill eventually lands.

The argument

In a small city, the finance office is a single point of failure

A city of Sausalito’s size keeps its books with a small staff; it employed about 125 people in 2024, counting part-time workers.5 In an office that small, much of what the city knows about its own money lives with a handful of people, and when they leave, a good deal of that knowledge leaves with them. Jennifer Pahlka, a former U.S. deputy chief technology officer, argues in Recoding America that government fails less often from bad intentions than from a lack of capacity, meaning the people and systems that turn a decision into a result,6 and we think Sausalito is a small and unusually clear example of what she means.

The city has had no trouble accumulating money; ten years of budgets that together planned to break even added $13.5 million to its main fund. What it has struggled to keep is people, and it is not alone in that, since the national association of government finance officers reports that “demand for state and local public finance officers is outstripping the current supply of workers in the sector”.7 Sausalito’s finance office has changed hands five times since mid-2021, for a stretch it was run by an outside firm, and auditors reported material weaknesses in the books three years running. The top job has turned over as well: in 2026 the city manager left in May for a post with Marin County,8 the successor the council hired in May resigned in September, and the assistant city manager is now running the city on an interim basis.9 Through those years the record shows a council that has often learned what the city spent months after the money moved, when it could no longer do much about it.

There is also a thread back to the hill. A surplus can come from cautious revenue forecasts, or it can come from planned work that never got done, and the audits do not say which. Part 1 found one piece of planned work, the landslide hazard map, that sat for a year because of what the public works director called “other priorities” and “staffing issues,” and from the audits alone, a city that saved money and a city that could not get its work done look exactly the same.

Fiscal 2024-25

What the auditors found, and how the city explained it

In the year that ended June 30, 2025, Sausalito spent more than its council had approved on 14 separate lines of the budget, the largest being $400,043 on capital projects and $306,932 in community development, for a total of $1,365,243.10 The auditor’s draft said the city “did not consistently monitor expenditures against the approved appropriations,” and warned that the resulting noncompliance with legal spending limits “could increase the risk of unauthorized spending”.11 City staff’s explanation was that the spending had in fact been approved, by the city manager or the council, but that “due to staff turnover, the required budget adjustment requests were not submitted in a timely manner”.12

When the final audit came back in April, a woman speaking online described how the past several months had looked from outside City Hall. She had heard last fall that the city had found $2 million, she said, “then we didn’t find it,” “and then we found it again,” and finding a bunch of money, in her view, was just as bad as losing it. “I was sitting here squirming wondering why, if these items were over budget, why these invoices were even being paid. Where were the checks and balances?” Then she added a judgment from long experience: “I have never in my over 40 years here seen it this bad.”

Sausalito, Calif. · Sausalito City Council
City Council meeting — April 7, 2026
A member of the public, onlinePublic comment“then we didn’t find it”Official recording at 1:34:56 ↗
The same speakerPublic comment“I was sitting here squirming wondering why, if these items were over budget, why these invoices were even being paid. Where were the checks and balances?”Official recording at 1:35:13 ↗

The city manager, Chris Zapata, had already put the question to himself and answered it. “How does that happen and who’s responsible for that?” he said. “The answer is, I’m responsible for that.” He was also careful about what the number meant. “It doesn’t mean the city has a deficit of $1.4 million,” he said. “It means we spent $1.4 million without getting the budget appropriation from the council, but the budget was $1.6 million in the black.” Councilmember Ian Sobieski went further, arguing that calling the spending unauthorized was “a shorthand that’s to me misleading because they were all authorized.” We think both men have a point, and that the point cuts the other way too: if every dollar was authorized and the city still could not get the paperwork to the council in time, the problem was never the spending so much as the office behind it.

The finance office

Five years of handoffs

By the city’s memo and its own meeting recordings, since early 2021 the finance office has gone from an administrative services director, and then an interim finance director, to an outside firm, Virtual GovCFO, after the June 2021 budget cut the director’s post; then to a permanent director hired in October 2021, who resigned in March 2023; then to an interim director who was later made director; then to an interim director welcomed on April 1, 2025;13 and then to the current director, appointed that August.14

On March 18, 2025, in his report to the council, Zapata announced the finance director’s separation.15 More than a year later, in a memo prepared for the council’s 2026 audit review, the city said the separation was not about his work, which it calls “quality work,” and recorded two bonuses for audit improvements. The memo also says Kroll, an outside firm the city hired, reviewed the data from his city laptop twice and found nothing, and Kroll’s memorandum, dated March 5, 2026, reports “no artifacts indicative of financial fraud, credit card abuse, or malicious activity”.1617 That memorandum reached the public in April 2026, attached to the council’s agenda on the day of the meeting, which one council member noticed. “I have a question about when the Kroll memorandum was attached to the agenda because I didn’t see it before this meeting,” the council member said, and Zapata answered that it had gone in that day.

Mayor Woodside had offered the fairest summary of the period two months earlier, and it is one we share. “I think we had 3 different finance directors during the period, and it’s pretty clear the controls were not as rigid as they should have been,” he said. “And I don’t want to blame anybody for that. I just think that’s a fact.”

Ten years of audits

What a decade of Sausalito’s audits shows

The audits tell a similar story over a longer span. Sausalito’s auditors found material weaknesses, their most serious category of finding, in the audits for fiscal 2020, 2021 and 2022.181920 In the year that ended in June 2021 the city overspent its approved budget lines by $5,980,024,21 though the same page says the main fund’s share was “mainly due to” payments between city funds that had been budgeted as transfers, and that a matching gain on the transfer line “offsets the majority” of it. Several of the audits were not signed until well into the following year: the one for fiscal 2018 was signed 285 days after the year ended,22 the one for fiscal 2022 after 259 days23 and the latest after 239,24 while three others took about six months.252627

It would be unfair to treat that slowness as unusual, though, because waiting most of a year for an audit is common in California. A local government that spent at least $750,000 in federal money in fiscal 2025 had to file an audit with the federal government within 30 days of receiving the auditor’s report or nine months after its year ended, whichever came first.28 For the year that ended June 30, 2025, the clearinghouse had accepted filings from 252 California cities and towns by mid-November 2026; the typical one was accepted 270 days after its year ended, and 12 of the 252 within six months.29 Sausalito’s was accepted on March 31, 2026, at the nine-month mark, with no findings on its federal grants.30 By that measure Sausalito is ordinary, and the trouble in its record is what happened during the year, before any audit: budget changes that, in staff’s words, turnover kept from being filed in time, and, as the next section shows, sewer salaries charged to the wrong fund for most of a year before the council heard about it.

Through all of it, the money kept piling up. We compared each year’s final amended budget with what the audit later showed, for ten years, and found that the ten budgets together planned for the main fund to lose $56,568, while the audits show it gained $13,507,115. A surplus like that can come from cautious revenue forecasts or from budgeted work that never got done, and the audits, again, do not say which.

Sausalito’s budgets together planned to break even, and the main fund grew $13.5 million

Sources: FY16 audit, p. 80; FY17 audit, p. 78; FY18 audit, p. 80; FY19 audit, p. 80; FY20 audit, p. 82; FY21 audit, p. 78; FY22 audit, p. 84; FY23 audit, p. 100; FY24 audit, p. 96; FY25 audit, p. 98

−$2M$0+$2M+$4M+$6MFY16FY17FY18FY19FY20FY21FY22FY23FY24FY25
−$2M$0+$2M+$4M+$6M’16’17’18’19’20’21’22’23’24’25
Final budget planned: −$56,568 over 10 yearsAudit found: +$13,507,115 over 10 yearsEach year's mark sits above the zero line when the fund grew and below it when the fund shrank, with the planned change and the audited change shown side by side.

Change in the general fund balance each fiscal year (“net change in fund balance” on each audit’s budget-and-actual page). Fiscal years end June 30. A hollow dot marks a year the fund came in under its final budget.

June 2026

The council drew $1.1 million from the pension reserve to cover two shortfalls

The clearest single example came last June. On June 16, 2026, staff told the council that the general fund would finish the year $474,985 short and the sewer fund $643,491 short, and proposed covering both with $1,118,476 from the trust the city keeps for pension costs. The sewer shortfall, which staff called an accounting error, came mostly from a handoff: the city had given its sewer operation to a regional district the summer before, and the salaries of the people involved “were not reallocated to the proper General Fund accounts in a timely manner”.31 The same handoff had also put $1.6 million into the pension trust, and staff’s table showed the trust ending the year larger than it stood on May 1.32

Councilmember Joan Cox said she was “caught off guard to be hearing this information in this item,” and that she wanted a full chance to discuss how the pension trust was being treated in the items that followed, and someone else on the dais asked the question a resident watching at home might have asked: “what’s the accounting error?” The council approved the draw unanimously, and we found no further council discussion of it in our transcripts of meetings through October.

Where the money stands

What the record shows, and what it does not

The outside firm that examined the former finance director’s city laptop reported no sign of fraud on it, and the main fund ended the year with a fund balance of $24.7 million.171 What the record also shows is a government that learns what it has, and what it has spent, well after the fact, as when the council learned in June that sewer salaries had been booked to the wrong fund for most of a year. Hoffman had described the earlier problem, the overspent budget lines, plainly back in February. “This was a shock,” she said. “It’s a significant deficiency in our accounting practices, as identified by our city auditor.” Two months later, a member of the public was asking the council where the checks and balances were.

Next in the series: The conclusion, which reads the three parts together and asks what one town’s meetings say about how the rest of the country governs itself.

Methodology

How we checked

The documents: Each figure from an audit, a staff report or a city memo was read off the linked page by two AI models from different companies, working separately, and the budget-versus-audit table was read from all ten audits and matched on all 40 numbers.

The meetings: Hamlet’s transcripts are speech-to-text made from the city’s public video. Each quote was matched word for word to the transcript, with “um”, “uh” and repeated false starts removed and nothing else changed, and then checked against the audio by a second company’s speech model and again by the first; no person has listened to them. On two lines the models heard a word differently, and those words are left outside the quotation marks. Each video link opens a few seconds before the first words quoted.

The people: Officials are named where the city’s minutes or a separate check tied the words to them. We have not named the former finance director, who was not asked for comment, or members of the public, although the city’s own video and documents, which we link, show names.

Credit: The Marin Independent Journal’s Krissy Waite and Steven Rosenfeld reported on the separation and the audit as they happened.

The comparison with other cities: The count of California cities and towns comes from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse, the federal government’s database of audits filed by governments that spent at least $750,000 in federal money in the year (the threshold for fiscal years that began before Oct. 1, 2024; it is now $1 million), as it stood on Nov. 16, 2026. We kept city and town governments only, one filing per city, with a fiscal year ending June 30, 2025, and measured the days from the year’s end to the date the clearinghouse accepted each filing; the file lists every city and town with a link to its filing. The clearinghouse also records whether an audit found a material weakness, but it has published a notice that this field was filled from the wrong source for older filings, so we did not use it to compare cities.

What is not here: We filed no records requests and interviewed no one, so we do not know what the outside review cost or whether a fuller report exists.

Sources & Data

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