On Feb. 26, 2019, twelve days after a hillside in Sausalito gave way in the middle of the night and carried a woman down the slope inside her house, the City Council met for four hours and 41 minutes. The landslide took up 99 of them and ended with a unanimous vote of the four members present to waive permit fees for replacing, in kind, what the slide had damaged. Later the same night the council took up an appeal between two neighbors over an addition to a house, how large it would be and how close it would sit to the lot next door, and that item ran 137 minutes, long enough for one council member to say, “I can’t believe we’re here over 9 inches.” It would be easy to tell that evening as a joke about a fussy town, but we think it is better understood as a small, accurate picture of how most local government in America works, and the rest of this series is an attempt to explain why.
Local government is the level Americans think best of; in a 2023 Pew survey, 61% of adults had a favorable view of their local government, against 22% for the federal government.1 The people who do show up to it, though, are a particular slice of the town. When the political scientists Katherine Levine Einstein, David Glick and Maxwell Palmer studied who commented at zoning meetings in Massachusetts towns for their book Neighborhood Defenders, they found that 73 percent were homeowners, against 46 percent of voters,2 and the newspapers that report back to everyone else are shrinking, having lost more than three-quarters of their jobs since 2005.3 A government built to answer the room will, reasonably enough, answer the people in it, and a dispute between two neighbors fills that room in a way a hillside never can, because the neighbors each have something concrete to lose that evening while the risk on the hill is spread across everyone and may not come due for years.
Economists described the logic decades ago: William Fischel calls homeowners “homevoters” and argues that they dominate American local government because it is the institution best placed to raise or lower the value of their largest asset,4 and Mancur Olson argued in 1965 that a small group with a concentrated stake will usually out-organize a large group with a shared one.5 What those theories leave open is how much it matters in practice, which risks end up waiting and for how long, and that is the question a town’s own meeting record can answer, if someone reads all of it.